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Abstract. Evidence that individuals have dynamically consistent preferences is usually
generated by studying the discount rates of the individual over different horizons,
but where those rates are elicited at a single point in time. If these elicited discount
rates vary by horizon the individual is typically claimed to have preferences that
imply a dynamic inconsistency, although this inference requires additional
assumptions such as intertemporal separability. However, what one really wants to
know is if the same subject has the same discount rate function when that individual
is asked at a later point in time. Such panel tests then require than one allow for
possible changes in the states of nature that the subject faces, since they may
confound any in-sample comparisons of discount rate functions at different points in
time. We report the results of a large-scale panel experiment undertaken in the field
that allows us to examine this issue. In June 2003 we elicited subjective discount rates
from 253 subjects, representative of the adult Danish population. Between
September 2003 and November 2004 we re-visited 97 of these subjects and repeated
these tasks. In each visit we also elicited information on their individual
characteristics, as well as their expectations about the state of their own economic
situation and macroeconomic variables. We find evidence in favor of dynamic
consistency.
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Evidence that individuals have dynamically consistent preferences is usually generated by
studying the discount rates of the individual over different horizons, but where those rates are
elicited at a single point in time. Thus a subject might be asked to state their discount rate over an
18-month period starting at some reference point in time, and then state their discount rate over a
24-month period starting from the same reference point. If these elicited discount rates vary by
horizon the individual is typically claimed to have preferences that imply a “dynamic inconsistency,”
although this inference requires additional assumptions such as inter-temporal separability and an
assumed temporal stability in the discount rate function elicited at some point in time. If these
assumptions are made, then the individual could behave in a dynamically inconsistency manner, by
holding and acting on preferences at one point in time that contradict the preferences of the same
individual at a later date.
Following Strotz [1955-56], there have been two broad theoretical responses to this
possibility. The first is to explore alternative ways in which the decision-maker might look ahead today
and take deliberate actions today in awareness of the potential future problem. For example, the
agent might knowingly choose to engage in addictive behavior, despite the known consequences
(which could be probabilistic). Or the agent might undertake some pre-commitment strategy by
constraining the feasible set of future choices. The second broad approach is to explore the
implications of the agent looking backwards when confronted with the later choice, and taking the
earlier choice into account with some non-separable multi-period utility function (e.g., Machina
[1989] and McClennan [1990]). Thus, even if there were evidence that the decision-maker holds
preferences that might lead to dynamically inconsistent choices, it does not follow that such choices
will ever be observed in the sense that the decision-maker would want to change behavior over the
entire time period.
However, before worrying about ways that the individual could address possible dynamic
inconsistencies, we need to be sure that the behavioral premiss is valid. What one really wants to
know is if the same subject has the same discount rate function when that individual is asked at a later1 Our experiments are “artefactual field experiments” in the terminology of Harrison and List [2004]. List
[2003] appears to have reported the first longitudinal field experiment.
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point in time. To take the earlier example, the issue is whether the 6-month discount rate of the
individual in our earlier example changes in a year’s time, when it spans the remaining time of the
original 18-month discount rate; or whether the 6-month discount rate of the individual changes in
18 months time, when is spans the remaining time of the original 24-month discount rate. Only if
these “overlapping” discount rates differ can we say that there is a possibility of a dynamic
inconsistency. As noted, this is typically tested by eliciting a “snapshot” of the discount rate function
at some point in time, and then just assuming the (popular) structure that causes problems.
Remarkably, there have been few direct tests of this empirical premiss of the dynamic
inconsistency literature using real rewards. Such longitudinal tests require that one allow for possible
changes in the states of nature that the subject faces, since they may confound any in-sample
comparisons of discount rate functions at different points in time.
We report the results of a large-scale longitudinal experiment undertaken in the field that
allows us to examine this issue.
1 In June 2003 we elicited subjective discount rates from 253 subjects,
representative of the adult Danish population. Between September 2003 and November 2004 we re-
visited 97 of these subjects and repeated these tasks. In each visit we also elicited information on
their individual characteristics, as well as their expectations about the state of their own economic
situation and macroeconomic variables. We find evidence in favor of dynamic consistency.
We review our experimental design in section 1, and discuss our procedures in section 2. We
present the evidence in section 3, using in-sample comparisons and out-of-sample comparisons. We
also consider the effects of allowing for changes in the states of nature that might confound any
inferences. In section 4 we review previous evidence on these issues, and in section 5 we draw
conclusions.-3-
1. Experimental Design
A. The Basic Elicitation Procedure
The basic experimental design for eliciting individual discount rates (IDRs) was introduced
in Coller and Williams [1999] (CW) and expanded in Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] (HLW). The
basic question asked of subjects is extremely simple: do you prefer $100 today or $100+x tomorrow,
where x is some positive amount?  If the subject prefers the $100 today then we can infer that the
discount rate is higher than x% per day; otherwise, we can infer that it is x% per day or less. The
format of the previous experiments modified and extended this basic question in six ways, which we
retain here.
First, we pose a number of such questions to each individual, each question varying x by
some amount. When x is zero we would obviously expect the individual to reject the option of
waiting for no rate of return. As we increase x we would expect more individuals to take the future
income option. For any given individual, the point at which they switch from choosing the current
income option to taking the future income option provides a bound on their discount rate. That is,
if an individual takes the current income option for all x from 0 to 10, then takes the future income
option for all x from 11 up to 100, we can infer that his discount rate lies between 10% and 11% for
this time interval. The finer the increments in x, the more precisely we will be able to pinpoint the
discount rate of the individual.
Second, the experimental task used an Multiple Price List (MPL) format, simultaneously
posing several questions with varying values of x. After all questions had been completed by the
individual, one of the questions was chosen at random for actual payment. In this way the results
from one question do not generate income effects which might influence the answers to other
questions. This feature of the design mimics the format used by Holt and Laury [2002] in their risk
aversion experiments: in that case the rows reflected different probabilities of each prize, and in this2 We exploit this similarity of format in the design of our computerized interface to subjects, and in the use of
trainers in the risk aversion task as a generic substitute for trainers in the discount rate task.
3  Including the possibility of default by the experimenter.
4  To explain the censoring problem, assume that you value a cold beer at $3, which is to say that if you had to
pay $3 for one beer you would. If I ask you whether or not you are willing to pay $2.50 for a lab beer, your response to
me will depend on whether or not there is a market price of field beer (assumed to be the same as the lab beer) lower than
$2.50. If the market price of the field beer is $2.00, and you know that you can buy a beer outside the lab at this price,
then you would never rationally reveal to me that you would pay $2.50 for my lab beer. In this case we say that your
response is censored by the market price (Harrison, Harstad and Rutström [2004]). CW and HLW discuss procedures for
allowing for censoring in the context of discount rate elicitation.
5 CW suggest that behavior in previous studies may be affected by uncontrolled factors other than time
preferences that may help explain observed anomalies. They suggest that subjects may attempt to arbitrage between lab
and field investment opportunities, but may make mistakes in comparing these opportunities because the lab and field
investments are “priced” in different terms. Lab investments are priced in dollar terms (the difference between the early
and later payments), while field investments are priced in terms of annual and effective interest rates. A rational subject
should never choose to postpone payment in the laboratory at interest rates lower than those she can receive in the
external market, for example, but she may make mistakes in converting dollar interest to an interest rate (or vice versa)
for the purposes of comparison. The use of hypothetical or small payments is likely to exacerbate this problem because
of the cognitive costs associated with the subject’s arbitrage problem; at lower stakes subjects are likely to expend less
cognitive effort on getting the comparison right.
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case the rows reflect different annual effective rates of return.
2
Third, subjects are provided two future income options rather than one “instant income”
option and one future income option. For example, they might be offered $100 in one month and
$100+x in 7 months, so that we interpret the revealed discount rate as applying to a time horizon of
6 months. This avoids the potential problem of the subject facing extra risk or transactions costs
3
with the future income option, as compared to the “instant” income option. If the delayed option
were to involve such additional transactions costs, then the revealed discount rate would include
these subjective transactions costs. By having both options entail future income we hold these
transactions costs constant.
Fourth, subjects were asked to provide information to help identify what market rates of
interest they face. This information was used to allow for the possibility that their responses in the
discount rate task are censored by market rates.
4
Fifth,  respondents were provided with information on the interest rates implied by the
delayed payment option. This is an important control feature if field investments are priced in terms
of interest rates. If subjects are attempting to compare the lab investment to their field options, this
feature may serve to reduce comparison errors since now both lab and field options are priced in the
same metric.
56 We are grateful to Sydbank for administrative assistance with the money transfers.
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Sixth, while CW examined a 6-month time horizon only,  HLW analyzed questions of time-
consistent preferences by eliciting discount rates for four time horizons: 6 months, 12 months, 24
months, and 36 months. Some subjects were randomly assigned a single time horizon, while others
were asked to state their preferences for each of the four time horizons, allowing for a test of the
effect of asking subjects to consider multiple time horizons.
Subjects in the HLW experiments were given payoff tables such as the one illustrated in
Table 1. They were told that they must choose between payment Options A and B for each of the
20 payoff alternatives. Option A was 3000 DKK in all sessions. Option B paid 3000 DKK + X
DKK, where X ranged from annual rates of return of 2.5% to 50% on the principal of 3000 DKK,
compounded quarterly to be consistent with general Danish banking practices on overdraft
accounts. The payoff tables provided the annual and annual effective interest rates for each payment
option, and the experimental instructions defined these terms by way of example.
Across all time horizons considered by HLW, payoffs to any one subject could range from
3,000 DKK up to 12,333 DKK. The exchange rate when the HLW experiments were conducted in
mid-1997 was approximately 6.7 DKK per US dollar, so this range converts to $450 and $1,840.
We used the multiple-horizon treatment from HLW. From the perspective of the task faced
by the subjects, the only variations are that the instrument is now computerized, and subjects are
presented with 6 discount rate tasks in the first series of experiments, corresponding to 6 different
time horizons: 1 month, 4 months, 6 months, 12 months, 18 months, and 24 months.
In addition, there are some minor changes in payment procedures. In the HLW experiments,
a certificate for future payment was guaranteed by the Social Research Institute, which was
redeemable on the payment date for a check issued by that Institute. In this study, future payments
are guaranteed by the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, and made by automatic
transfer from the Ministry’s bank account to the subject’s bank account.
6 This payment procedure is
similar to a post-dated check, and automatic transfers between bank accounts are a common7 Anderhub, Gneezy, Güth and Sonsino [2001] use post-dated checks for deferred payments in their study of
individual risk and time preferences, a practice that is available in Israel. The early payment is due immediately, and they
find that individual discount rates are constant over the 4- to 8-week periods considered in the study. 
8 If the subject always chooses A, or indicates indifference for any of the decision rows, there are no additional
decisions required and the task is completed. Furthermore, the iterative format has some “smarts” built into it: when the
values being elicited drop to some specified perceptive threshold (e.g., 0.05 of a percentage point), the iMPL collapses
down to an endogenous number of final rows and the elicitation task stops iterating after those responses are entered.
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procedure in Denmark.
7 We conjecture that this feature will reduce transaction costs and credibility
issues associated with future payments. Finally, while CW and HLW randomly select a single
“Assignee” from the group of subjects in a given session to actually receive the payment associated
with his decision, in these new experiments each subject is given a 10% chance to receive actual
payment.
We implement one extension of the basic MPL procedure in order to elicit more refined
intervals of IDRs, but maintaining the transparency of the incentives of the basic MPL. We do so in
the form of a computerized variant on the basic MPL format which we call an Iterative MPL
(iMPL).
The basic MPL is the standard format in which the subject sees a fixed array of paired
options and chooses one for each row. It allows subjects to switch back and forth as they like, and
has already been used in many experiments. The iMPL format extends this by first asking the subject
to simply choose the row at which he wants to first switch from option A to option B, assuming
monotonicity of the underlying preferences to automatically fill out the remaining choices. The
second extension of the MPL format is to then allow the individual to make choices from refined
options within the option last chosen. That is, if someone decides at some stage to switch from
option A to option B between probability values of 0.1 and 0.2, the next stage of an iMPL would
then prompt the subject to make more choices within this interval, to refine the values elicited.
8
The iMPL uses the same incentive logic as the MPL. After making all responses, the subject
has one row from the first table selected at random by the experimenter. In the MPL that is all there
is. In the iMPL, that is all there is if the row selected at random by the experimenter is not the one
that the subject switched at in the first table. If it is the row that the subject switched at, another9 Their design also considered an intermediate institution, the Sequential Multiple Price List, which enforces
monotonicity of choices within a given ordered list of choices but does not undertake iterations to refine the interval
selected. The iMPL combines enforced monotonicity and iterations to refine choices.
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random draw is made to pick a row in the second table that the subject was presented with, and so
on.
As the subject iterates in the iMPL the choices become more and more alike, by design.
Hence one would expect that greater cognitive effort would be needed to discriminate between
them. At some point we expect the subject to express indifference, which we account for in our
analysis by only considering the interval over which the subject could (strictly) discriminate. In fact,
one possible explanation to why subjects have been observed switching back and forth between
choices in MPL is that they are indifferent. If so, explicitly including an indifference option, as we do
here, may be a cleaner way to capture this behavior.
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström [2004] report results from a complementary series of
laboratory experiments in Copenhagen which were designed explicitly to test the properties of the
iMPL procedure in comparison to the MPL procedure.
9 They conclude that the iMPL format has no
discernible effect on elicited discount rates, that there is no effect from framing on discount rates,
but that there is a small order effect on the second task after the initial task (around 3½ percentage
points).
B. Panel Experiments
Table 2 displays the panel design of our experiments. We conducted five series of
experiments, beginning in June 2003. Series 1 was the “base camp,” where we interviewed 253
subjects. In this experiment we elicited responses for six time horizons, as indicated by the first row:
1-month, 4-months, 6-months, 12-months, 18-months and 24-months. We also elicited responses to
a number of questions about the recent and prospective well-being of the individual, including his
perception of the future state of the economy. In all cases we used a front end delay of 1 month.
Across series 2 through 5 we re-visited 97 of these 253 subjects. The objective was to re-visit10 Further details are provided in Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2005].
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100 of them, split roughly equally in time. The actual sample sizes were close to this, with 26, 23, 23
and 25 in each of the four series. These experiments were conducted in September 2003 (3 months
after Series 1), November 2003 (5 months after), May 2004 (11 months after), and November 2004
(17 months after). 
To see the logic of the design, consider the horizons for which we elicited an IDR in Series
2, and compare those to Series 1. Series 2 occurred 3 months after Series 1. We elicited an IDR for a
1-month horizon in Series 2, which overlaps the IDR elicited for the 4-month horizon in Series 1.
Similarly, the 3-month horizon in Series 2 overlaps the 6-month horizon in Series 1; the 9-month
horizon elicited in Series 2 overlaps the 12-month horizon elicited in Series 1; the 15-month horizon
elicited in Series 2 overlaps the 18-month horizon elicited in Series 1; and finally the 21-month
horizon elicited in Series 2 overlaps the 24-month horizon elicited in Series 1. Series 3, 4 and 5
provide comparable series of horizons vis-a-vis the horizons for which we elicited discount rates in
Series 1. 
2. Experimental Procedures
A. Sampling Procedures for Series 1
The sample for the field experiments in Series 1 was designed to generate a representative
sample of the adult Danish population. There were six steps in the construction of the original
sample,
10 essentially following those employed in Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002]:
• First, a random sample of 25,000 Danes was drawn from the Danish Civil Registration
Office in January 2003. Only Danes born between 1927 and 1983 were included, thereby
restricting the age range of the target population to between 19 and 75. For each person in
this random sample we had access to their name, address, county, municipality, birth date,
and sex. Due to the absence of names and/or addresses, 28 of these records were discarded.
• Second, we discarded 17 municipalities (including one county) from the population, due to11 The first person suffered from dementia and could not remember the instructions; the second person was a
76 year old woman who was not able to control the mouse and eventually gave up; the third person had just won a world
championship in sailing and was too busy with media interviews to stay for two hours; and the fourth person was sent
home because they arrived after the instructions had begun and we had already included one unexpected “walk-in” to fill
their position. 
12 Certain events might have plausibly triggered some of the no-shows: for example, 3 men did not turn up on
June 11, 2003, but that was the night that the Danish national soccer team played a qualifying game for the European
championships against Luxembourg that was not scheduled when we picked session dates.
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them being located in extraordinarily remote locations. The population represented in these
locations amounts to less than 2% of the Danish population, or 493 individuals in our
sample of 25,000 from the Civil Registry.
• Third, we assigned each county either 1 session or 2 sessions, in rough proportionality to the
population of the county. In total we assigned 20 sessions. Each session consisted of two
sub-sessions at the same locale and date, one at 5pm and another at 8pm, and subjects were
allowed to choose which sub-session suited them best.
• Fourth, we divided 6 counties into two sub-groups because the distance between some
municipalities in the county and the location of the session would be too large. A weighted
random draw was made between the two sub-groups and the location selected, where the
weights reflect the relative size of the population in September 2002. 
• Fifth, we picked the first 30 or 60 randomly sorted records within each county, depending
on the number of sessions allocated to that county. This provided a sub-sample of 600.
• Sixth, we mailed invitations to attend a session to the sub-sample of 600, offering each
person a choice of times for the session. Response rates were low in some counties, so
another 64 invitations were mailed out in these counties to newly drawn subjects. Everyone
that gave a positive response was assigned to a session, and our recruited sample was 268. 
Attendance at the experimental sessions was extraordinarily high, including 4 persons who
did not respond to the letter of invitation but showed up unexpectedly and participated in the
experiment. Four persons turned up for their session, but were not able to participate in the
experiments.
11 The experiments in series 1 were conducted in June of 2003, and a total of 253
subjects participated in the experiments.
12 Sample weights for the subjects in the experiment can be13 It is possible to undertake experiments over the web with a large sample of subjects drawn from the
population.  Kapteyn and Teppa [2003] illustrate how one can elicit hypothetical responses to elicit time preferences
using a panel of 2,000 Dutch households connected by home computer to surveys.  Although not concerned with risk
and time preferences directly, Hey [2002] illustrates how one can augment such electronic panel surveys with real
experiments. Donkers and van Soest [1999] elicit hypothetical risk and time preferences from pre-existing panels of
Dutch households being surveyed for other reasons. Similar exercises with hypothetical surveys include Hartog, Ferre-i-
Carbonnell and Jonker [2002] and van Praag and Booij [2003].
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constructed using this experimental design, and are used to calculate weighted distributions and
averages that better reflect the adult population of Denmark.
B. Conduct of the Sessions in Series 1
To minimize travel times for subjects, we reserved hotel meeting rooms in convenient
locations across Denmark in which to conduct sessions.
13 Because the sessions lasted for two hours,
light refreshments were provided. Participants met in groups of no more than 10. To conduct
computerized experiments in the field, it was cost-effective to purchase laptop computers and
transport them to the meeting sites. Each subject was identified by a unique ID number. For the
randomization procedures, two bingo cages were used in each session, one containing 100 balls and
the other containing 3 to 11 balls, depending on the number of decision rows in the iMPL used in
different treatments. We found two bingo cages to be the most transparent and convenient way to
generate random outcomes in the experiments. 
To begin the sessions, subjects were welcomed and reminded that they were to be paid 500
DKK for their participation to cover travel costs as long as they were able to stay for the full two
hours required for the experiment. Anyone who was not able to stay for the full two hours was paid
100 DKK and excused from the experiment. The experimenter then asked for a volunteer to inspect
and verify the bingo cages and number of bingo balls.
Instructions for the experiment were provided on the computer screens, and subjects read
through the instructions while the experimenter read them aloud. The experimenters followed the
same script and procedures for each session, documented in Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan
[2005].-11-
The experiment was conducted in four parts. Part I consisted of a questionnaire collecting
subjects’ socio-demographic characteristics. Specifically, we collected information on age, gender,
size of town the subject resided in, type of residence, primary occupation during the last 12 months,
highest level of education, household type (viz., marital status and presence of younger or older
children), number of people employed in the household, total household income before taxes,
whether the subject is a smoker, and the number of cigarettes smoked per day. Part IV consisted of
another questionnaire which elicits information on the subject’s financial market instruments, and
probes the subject for information on their expectations about their future economic conditions and
their own future financial position. The questionnaires are rather long, so we chose to divide them
across Parts I and IV in order to reduce subject fatigue and boredom. Part II consisted of four risk
aversion tasks, and Part III presented subjects with the six discount rate tasks similar to those
developed in Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002]. We will not discuss the risk aversion tasks here.
The six discount rate tasks incorporate the incentive structure described earlier. After
subjects completed the six tasks, several random outcomes were generated in order to determine
subject payments. For all subjects, one of the six tasks was chosen, then one of the decision rows in
that task was chosen. For those subjects whose decision at that row led to the second level of the
iMPL table, another random draw was required to choose a decision row in the second level, and yet
another random draw was required should that decision have led a subject to the third level in the
iMPL. To maintain anonymity we performed the draws without announcing to which subjects it
would apply. In the case where a subject indicated indifference for the chosen decision row, another
random draw determined whether the subject received the early payment option A or the later
payment option B. Finally, a 10-sided die was rolled for each subject. Any subject who received a roll
of “0” received actual payment according to that final outcome. 
A significant amount of time was spent training subjects on the iMPL and the randomization
procedures in Part II of the experiment. Subjects were given handouts containing examples of two
levels of an iMPL that had been filled in. The training exercise explained the logic of the iMPL and-12-
verified that subjects were able to correctly fill in an iMPL as shown in the handout. Next, the
experimenters illustrated the random procedures necessary to reach a final lottery outcome for each
possible choice in the selected decision row in the first level of the iMPL. Finally, a trainer task was
conducted in which payments were in the form of candies. The ten-sided die was rolled for each
subject, and candies were given to each subject who received a roll of “0.”
C. Procedures for Series 2 Through 5
Between September 2003 and November 2004 we re-visited 97 of the 253 subjects who
participated in Series 1 and repeated the individual discount rate tasks. Each subject was interviewed
in private in the four new series of experiments, because attendance at the experiments otherwise
would have been too low. To minimize travel times for subjects and encourage higher attendance,
we offered to conduct the experiment at their private residence, or at another convenient location of
their choice.
There were four steps in the construction of this sample. First, we assigned each of the 14
counties either 1 number or 2 numbers, in rough proportionality to the population of the county. In
total we assigned 20 numbers that also reflect the distribution of the 20 sessions in the sampling
procedures for Series 1. Second, although Denmark is a relatively small country, it was necessary to
consider logistical constraints, and we randomly picked 4 of the 20 numbers for each Series 2
through 5. This procedure implied that we at most should re-visit subjects from four counties in
each new series of experiments. Third, we picked the first 50% or 25% of the randomly sorted
records within each county, depending on the one or two numbers allocated to each county. This
provided a sub-sample of 100 subjects. Fourth, we contacted subjects by phone and invited them to
participate again in the experiments. It was difficult to get in contact with some subjects, and other
subjects did not want to participate again in the experiments, so we invited the next subjects on the
randomly sorted list of former participants until 26 people were signed up for each new series of14 We anticipated that a few subjects would cancel the meeting and thus signed up one extra subject for each
new series. Only 16% of the subjects refused or were not able to participate again, and we were unable to get in contact
with another 15% of the subjects. 
15 A box plot shows the median as a solid dot, the inter-quartile range as a shaded rectangle, and the range in






The interviews lasted about one hour, and each subject was paid 300 DKK for their
participation. For the randomization procedures, we used two 10-sided die (one numbered from 0 to
9 and the other numbered from 00 to 90), and eleven playing cards, numbered from 1 to 11. These
procedures were the most convenient way to generate random outcomes, and allowed us to avoid
bringing two large bingo cages to the meeting. The experiments were computerized, and all the
experimental procedures, tasks and monetary incentives were similar to those used in Series 1. Since
the subjects had prior experience with the experimental procedures, we did not spend time on
training subjects on the iMPL and randomization procedures. However, we maintained the trainer
task in which payments were in the form of candies. 
Table 3 provides the definitions of the explanatory variables used in the statistical analysis
and summary statistics. It is clear that our data set is quite different from the standard laboratory set
using college students, and that it is much more representative of the target population. There are no
significant differences in the composition of the two samples, although there were relatively more
subjects with substantial higher education and higher level income who participated in Series 2-5 of
the experiments compared to Series 1. 
3. Results
Figure 1 collects the raw results of our experiments. It displays the distribution of elicited
discount rates by horizon, using box plots for each horizon.
15 Panel A shows the raw results of the
Series 1 experiments and Panel B illustrates the raw results of the Series 2 through 5 experiments.
Panel C collates these results into one graph, for ease of comparability, with an asterisk indicating
that the data were generated in Series 1. The raw data here is the mid-point of the elicited discount16 Elicited discount rates are often criticized because they are so much higher than market interest rates.
Nevertheless, the consistency between rates elicited in various settings, including those inferred from actual consumption
behavior (Hausmann [1979], Hartman and Doane [1986], Ruderman, Levine and McMahon [1986]), put the burden of
proof on the critics to show why private individuals and households should be constrained by rates set on markets that
include many institutional traders. 
17 They are spectacularly lower than the rates reported in other field experiments by Eckel, Johnson and
Montmarquette [2005; p.258], who find short-term discount rates averaging 289% per annum. Rates as high as this are
actually quite common in the extensive psychology literature on discount rates that “scrambles” choices so that subjects
get different principals, horizons and/or front end delays on each choice (e.g., Kirby and Marakoviƒ [1996] and Kirby,
Petry and Bickel [1999]). Following Coller and Williams [1999], who also review earlier economics experiments of the
same format, it is now common to present subjects with an ordered series of choices to reduce simple confusion.
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rate interval, after all of the iterations of the iMPL have been completed. These comparisons across
horizons mix between-subject and within-subject comparisons; we examine these in a more
controlled statistical manner below. All discount rates reported here refer to annual effective interest
rates, for comparability across horizons.
We observe variations of elicited IDR across subjects, with a mean and median of 24.2% and
a standard deviation of 15.7%. These values are close to those reported in the earlier field study by
Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] on the Danish population, where the mean is 28.1%
16 They are
somewhat higher than the estimated rates found in comparable laboratory elicitation exercises on
American students by Coller and Williams [1999], who report a median of 17.7% using a horizon of
60 days.
17
The raw results indicate that there is considerable variation in discount rates across the
sample. The inter-quartile range generally varies from around 15% per annum to 35%, although
some subjects exhibit wider variation. Of course, this variation could just reflect heterogeneity in
subjective preferences. The raw results also point to elicited discount rates being relatively stable
across horizons. The only possible outlier to the eyeball is the median 1-month discount rate elicited
in Series 1, which is higher than the rest, but the difference is not large in relation to the variation
within each horizon.
There are limits to what one can infer from these raw data. For example, within the inter-
quartile range of Figure 3 there could be some subjects with sharply declining discount rate
functions by horizon, and others that are simply high-variance over the horizon. To better evaluate
the hypotheses of interest we must turn to in-sample comparisons across horizons, and then control18 We assume that the subjects have access to capital markets and use censored discount rates for all statistical
analyses. Market prices are relevant to the extent that subjects attempt to arbitrage between the investment instrument
provided in the experiment and field investment opportunities, even if utility is defined over income earned in the
experiment rather than over terminal lifetime wealth. 
19 This model allows for the deliberate survey design we employed. In particular, we allow for the fact that
subjects in one county were selected independently of subjects in other counties, as well as the possible correlation
between responses by the same subject. Comparable results are obtained if one uses uncensored discount rates instead of
censored discount rates, and if one controls for observed and unobserved individual characteristics using random-effects
panel regression, or adds controls for multiplicative heteroskedasticity. 
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for possible changes in the state of nature over time.
A. Within-Subject Comparisons
Figure 2 displays the data for the within-subjects comparisons that our experimental design
was constructed to allow.
18 We show the difference between the IDR elicited from the same subject
at two different points in time. If there was no change in that elicited IDR then the data point
underlying the histogram in Figure 2 would be zero. If the IDR had increased in Series 2, the data
point would have been positive. 
The differences in discount rates illustrated in Figure 2 do not have any apparent tendency to
be positive or negative. However, these differences in discount rates reflect all possible within-
subjects comparisons. A direct test of the hypothesis that discount rates are constant for each time
horizon considered in Series 1 is possible with a regression model in which the difference in
discount rates for any two comparable time horizons is the dependent variable and treated as a
binary dummy variable.
19 We also control for individual characteristics of the subject, and the
possibility of an experimenter effect.
Table 4 reports the results of the analysis of discount rates using censored values. There is
no statistically significant change in any of the elicited discount rates as one gets closer to a given
horizon in the Series 1 experiments. We can directly test for constancy of discount rates using the
statistical model in Table 4, by testing if the coefficients on each horizon are jointly equal to zero.
An adjusted Wald test of this hypothesis has a p-value of 0.855 Hence we cannot reject the hypothesis that
elicited discount rates are the same as the horizon they refer to is approached.
The results in Table 4 do not even point to any identifiable demographic segment of the-16-
Danish population that might have higher discount rates as the horizon approaches. Older Danes do
tend to exhibit significantly lower discount rates as the horizon approaches, but that is in the opposite
direction than predicted by the usual dynamic inconsistency story.
The only group that comes close to having higher discount rates are students, who have
discount rates that are on average 17.7percentage points higher as the horizon approaches. The 95%
confidence interval for this marginal effect is between -3.7 and + 39.2, and the effect has a p-value of
0.104. Thus it could be that the only subjects to exhibit behavior remotely consistent with the usual
presumption happen to be those most likely to be used in traditional laboratory experimental
environments. This would suggest that evidence from those environments and convenience samples
is unrepresentative of the population as a whole.
We can examine the possibility of an interaction between horizon length and consistency by
re-estimating the regression model in Table 4 separately for the 4-month, 6-month, 12-month, 18-
month and 24 month horizons in Series 1. The detailed results are reported in an Appendix
(available on request), and do point to some significant interactions. As our design would suggest,
we have larger sub-samples for the longer horizons in Series 1, since here are more opportunities to
observe comparable discount rates. Specifically, for the 4-month, 6-month, 12-month, 18-month
and 24-month sub-populations, we have samples of 26, 49, 72, 97 and 97, respectively.
For the 4-month horizon we can readily identify some segments of the population that are
more likely on average to exhibit dynamic inconsistency. People with children have discount rates
that are 34.3 percentage points higher (p-value of 0.086); those who live in a larger city of 20,000 or
more have discount rates that are 19.9 percentage points higher (p-value of 0.056), and students have
discount rates that are 29.1 percentage points higher (p-value of 0.042). These results are particularly
relevant since virtually all of the laboratory experiments with convenience student samples focus on
horizons of 4-months or shorter, to ensure credibility of payment within a give academic year. One
could easily envisage a sample of students generating significant evidence of dynamic inconsistency
in laboratory experiments.-17-
On the other hand, several demographic characteristics generate significant effects in the
opposite direction. Subjects that have larger households, longer education and have higher incomes
generate discount rates that are 15.9, 24.3 and 30.1 percentage points lower as the horizon
approaches. In each case these are also statistically significant at the 7.5% level or better. In addition,
there is a large effect for retired subjects, who have discount rates that are 64.8 percentage points
lower as the horizon approaches (p-value of 0.01). Taken together, these results point to
considerable heterogeneity in the population as a whole for the 4-month horizon: there are clearly
some segments that can be identified as behaving in the customary dynamically inconsistent manner,
there are some that can be identified as behaving in a dynamically inconsistent manner that is not
expected, and there are many that exhibit no evidence of dynamic consistency. This is not mixed
evidence for or against dynamic inconsistency: it is evidence that statistical inferences that fail to control for observable
heterogeneity will fail to identify these different preference patterns.
The sensitivity of this heterogeneity is evident if one moves to consider the 6-month horizon
results. Here we observe the none of the individual characteristics of the subjects are significant at
any conventional level, and there is no significant effect for students over this horizon. It might be
convenient if we could attribute this difference in estimated effects to the smaller sample size of the
4-month sub-population, but the smaller sample would actually lead to larger standard errors instead
of smaller standard errors.
For the 12-month horizon we find that average discount rates are higher as the horizon
approaches. The average discount rate is 24.8 percentage points higher for the 7-month horizon in
Series 3 (p-value of 0.038) and 21.7 percentage points higher for the 1-month horizon in Series 4 (p-
value of 0.095). These results suggest that subjects do behave in a dynamically inconsistent manner
over the one-year period, but the results do not condition on changes in the state of nature during
this time horizon, which are discussed below. Looking at individual characteristics, we find that
older subjects and those with children have lower discount rates as the 12-month horizon
approaches. Older subjects have discount rates that are 23.7 percentage points lower (p-value of20 We also observe the only statistically significant experimenter effect for any horizon, resulting in discount
rates that are 12.5 percentage points lower when Steffen Andersen conducted the session instead of Morten Lau. Our
inferences control for this effect, and remain valid as long as we assume that there is no interaction between the
experimenter and demographics.
21 Harrison, Johnson, McInnes and Rutström [2005] demonstrate the temporal stability of risk attitudes in lab
experiments over a period of 4 months.
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0.028), and subjects with children have discount rates that are 12.7 percentage points lower (p-value
of 0.082). The negative coefficient for subjects with children is qualitatively different from the
positive effect for the 4-month horizon, and points to considerable interaction between the horizon
and subjects with children. 
There are no statistically significant changes in elicited discount rates as one gets closer to the
18-month horizon. The only individual characteristics that are significant is students and subjects
with children. Discount rates are 23.9 percentage points higher for students (p-value of 0.033), and
this time subjects with children have discount rates that are 14.6 percentage points higher  when the
18-month horizon gets closer (p-value of 0.045).
20 
Finally, for the 24-month horizon we find that students have discount rates that are 17.3
percentage points higher than non-students as the horizon approaches (p-value of 0.036), and none
of the other individual characteristics of the subjects are statistically significant. The overall results
thus suggest that individual discount rates are dynamically consistent, with the possible exception of
the 12-month horizon, and students are more likely on average to exhibit dynamic inconsistency
over the 4- to 24-month horizons considered here. 
B. Controlling for Changes in the States of Nature
Although we visited the same person at a later date, the fact that a certain amount of time
had to pass means that there may have been changes in the preferences of the individual. If we are
prepared to just assume that preferences are stable over the 17-month time difference between our
first and last experimental sessions, then we can rest on the statistical analysis presented above.
Although there is some evidence that risk attitudes are temporally stable over time, including some
evidence for our sample, common sense indicates that preferences could be state-dependent.
21 We22 In the demographic survey conducted in Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] we literally had one subject ask
us if he wanted us to state his current sex or the sex he would be at the end of the longest horizon.
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therefore evaluate the extent to which observable changes in states of nature might change our
conclusions.
In each series we asked subjects to respond to seven questions about their perception of the
state of the economy in general and their own personal financial situation. In each case we asked for
their perception for horizons, denoted X below, of 1, 4, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months:
• Would you say that you and your family are better off or worse off financially than you were
X months ago? 
• Now looking ahead, do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to
higher expenses or lower expenses during the next X months?
• Do you expect any major change in your family situation that will lead to higher earnings or
lower earnings during the next X months?
• On balance, do you think that you and your family will be better off or worse off financially
X months from now?
• Turning to the economic conditions in the country as a whole, would you say that at the
present time economic conditions are better or worse than they were X months ago?
• Do you think that there will be more or less unemployment during the next X months?
• Do you think that interest rates for borrowing money will go up or go down during the next
X months?
We readily concede that these questions do not exhaust the set of conceivable events that
could occur over the horizon of interest,
22 but they are certainly a good general place to start looking
for possible effects from changes in states of nature.
We construct a variable for each subject using their responses to these questions. For each
question we asked if they thought that there would be an improvement, a worsening, no change, or
whether they did not know. We coded improvements as 1, a worsening as -1, no change as 0, and
don’t know as missing. For each question and horizon we can then calculate the change from the-20-
response in the Series 1 session to the comparable response in the later session. Thus for any
question-horizon-subject the difference could be +2, +1, 0, -1, -2 or missing. We then calculate the
sum for each individual over all horizons of a given question; as it happens, these tended to be
positively correlated. Thus each individual had a value which reflected the extent to which they
expected improvement or worsening in each state over the various horizons considered in Series 1.
There are many ways to summarize these data, but this statistic seems sensible here. 
Table 5 describes these statistics of the changes in states of nature. A positive value means
that subjects believe that the specific state of nature is improved at the time of the later sessions
compared to Series 1, and vice versa for negative values. In general, subjects are more optimistic
about the state of the economy and their own personal financial situation at the later session
compared to the base camp, although they seem to have become a bit more pessimistic about future
personal income and expenditures. The subjects have a more positive impression of the current state
of the economy compared to the past, and they have become more optimistic about the general level
of unemployment during the next two years. Finally, we observe that subjects are more pessimistic
about changes in interest rates and they are more inclined to believe that the interest rate for
borrowing money will go up in the near future. 
Table 6 extends the regression model of Table 4 by including these measures of the change
in each state of nature for each individual. There are some interesting changes in the estimated
effects of the explanatory variables. First, we find that the states of nature are generally statistically
insignificant, with the exception of the variable reflecting beliefs about the present state of the
economy compared to the past (p-value of 0.002). On the whole the states of nature do not have a
statistically significant joint effect (p-value of 0.125). Second, the size of the estimated change in the
discount rate does not change. In other words, at the risk of some double negatives, there is no
change in the lack of evidence of an increase in discount rates as the horizon approaches. Moreover,
a test of the joint hypothesis that all of the horizon dummies are zero again leads to the null
hypothesis not being rejected (p-value of 0.809). Finally, we observe comparable demographic23 The sample size for the 4-month horizon in which we include changes in the states of nature does not have
sufficient degrees of freedom for reliable estimation, and is therefore not reported here. 
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effects from students. Conditional on changes in the states of nature, we find that students have
discount rates that are on average 19.2 percentage points higher as the horizon approaches. The
95% confidence interval for this marginal effect is between -2.2 and + 40.5, and the effect has a p-
value of 0.077. 
We can again examine the possibility of an interaction effect between horizon length and
consistency by estimating the model in Table 6 separately for the 6-month, 12-month, 18-month and
24-month horizons in Series 1, conditional on experimenter effects, individual characteristics and
changes in states of nature.
23 The results again point to some significant interaction effects.
For the 6-month horizon, we find that none of the individual characteristics of the subjects
are significant at the 10% confidence level or better, which is consistent with the results from the
comparable model without control for changes in states of nature. We also observe that two of the
variables that reflect the states of nature are statistically significant, but generate effects in opposite
directions. The variable that reflects beliefs about the present state of the economy compared to the
past is negative with a coefficient that is equal to -2.4 percentage points (p-value of 0.096), whereas
the variable that elicits beliefs about the general unemployment outlook is positive and equal to 2.7
percentage points (p-value of 0.059). 
Moving to the 12-month horizon, we find that discount rates are higher as the horizon gets
closer, but the coefficients with respect to the horizon dummies are now statistically insignificant
when we control for changes in states of nature. The results also show that the discount rate is 10.2
percentage points higher for subjects who live in the greater Copenhagen area (p-value of 0.057),
whereas middle-aged and older subjects have discount rates that are 17.8 and 19.8 percentage points
lower with p-values of 0.047 and 0.066, respectively. Turning to state dependency, the variable that
reflects beliefs about the present state of the economy compared to the past is again negative and
statistically significant (p-value of 0.003). 
For the 18-month horizon, we find that students and subjects with children have higher24 Excellent reviews of the literature, with a critical eye to the potential for such confounds to affect behavior,
can be found in Coller and Williams [1999] and Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue [2002; §6].
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discount rates when the horizon approaches, and these effects are similar to those in the regression
that does not control for state dependency. The average discount rate is 23.8 percentage points
higher for students than for non-students (p-value of 0.040), and subjects with children have
discount rates that are 17.1 percentage points higher than otherwise (p-value of 0.018). We again
observe that the variable that reflects beliefs about the present state of the economy compared to the
past is negative and statistically significant (p-value of 0.007). 
Finally, the results for the 24-month horizon show that students again have higher discount
rates as the horizon get closer (the coefficient is equal to 20.3 percentage points with a p-value of
0.019), and the only significant variable with respect to state dependency is beliefs about the present
state of the economy compared to the past, which again is negative and equal to -1.8 percentage
points (p-value of 0.032). Taken together, the results suggest that individual discount rates are
dynamically consistent over the time horizons considered here, and none of the horizon dummies
are statistically significant when the regression models condition on changes in the states of nature.
We also observe that students continue to behave in a dynamically consistent manner over the 18- to
24-month horizons when we control for changes in states of nature, which is remarkable since we
also control for other characteristics that students normally “carry” with them, such as age. 
4. Previous Evidence
Our design differs in several ways from those used in previous literature. Quite apart from
the panel nature of our design, which is the main contribution, we employ procedures that have
evolved in recent studies to mitigate potential confounds.
24 An appendix discusses these design
features in detail, with citation to the literature, but the basic points are easy to follow.
First, we use real rewards instead of hypothetical rewards. There is debate about the
importance of using real rewards, with many “behavioral economists” defending the use of25 Necessary but not always sufficient: see Harrison [1989].
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hypothetical surveys and many “mainstream experimental economists” insisting on real rewards. We
believe that the evidence supports the latter camp, but simply do not see this issue as fundamental. If
the claims of the behaviorists do not survive when one uses real rewards, then their claims are
extraordinarily fragile and not worth taking seriously. Since there is evidence that real and
hypothetical tasks differ in some task domains, why risk adding a confound by failing to ensure the
control over subject motivation that requires real rewards as a necessary
25 condition?
Second, we do not “scramble” tasks that involve different horizons, principals and premia to
delay. Our MPL is deliberately ordered, to provide subjects with a transparent task that leads to
them revealing their discount rate. Many experiments have used tasks presented to subjects in a
random order, but this adds potential confounds due to computational complexity that we prefer to
avoid. In a related vein, we provide information to the subject about the implied annual effective
interest rate, to facilitate comprehension of the task in a relatively familiar manner.
Finally, we provide a FED of one month on all options. This FED is intended to mitigate
the possible effects of differential credibility of payment between the two horizons. Frederick,
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue [2002; p.382] explain the problem well:
In experimental studies, subjects are typically instructed to assume that delayed
rewards will be delivered with certainty. It is unclear whether subjects do (or can)
accept this assumption, because delay is ordinarily – and perhaps unavoidably –
associated with uncertainty. A similar problem arises for field studies, in which it is
typically assumed that subjects believe that future rewards, such as energy savings,
will materialize. Because of this subjective (or “epistemic”) uncertainty associated
with delay, it is difficult to determine to what extent the magnitude of imputed
discount rates (or the shape of the discount function) is governed by time preference
per se, versus the diminution in subjective probability associated with delay.
The implication of using a non-trivial FED, as emphasized by Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2003],
is that one cannot discriminate between exponential preferences and quasi-hyperbolic preferences.
On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine public policy investments and major personal decisions
that do not entail some legal or contractual FED option.
Our sense from the literature that examines these design features is that it is the second and26  See Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] and Harrison, Lau, Rutström and Sullivan [2005]. The qualifier
“essentially” is added to acknowledge that there is some evidence that the average elicited discount rates for the 1-month
horizon are slightly higher than those for longer horizons. The effect is very small, in the order of a few percentage
points, and hardly the stuff of major dynamic inconsistency.
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third that makes a major difference to elicited discount rates, and hence to the likely stability of
elicited rates over time. Scrambling is generally associated with annual discount rates that are
extraordinarily high, as noted earlier. Similarly, the absence of a FED increases elicited rates by
hundreds of percentage points in most designs.
5. Conclusions
We have shown that subjects in Denmark behave as if they have constant discount rates
over time when the front end delay is one month. This is essentially true if we consider discount
rates over different planning horizons that are elicited at a single point in time,
26 as well as over time
when one revisits the same subject. Comparable laboratory experiments for significantly shorter
planning horizons suggest that this conclusion generalizes to settings in which the front end delay is
as short as one week, but that it does not generalize to settings in which the initial option is available
immediately (Coller and Williams [1999] and Coller, Harrison and Rutström [2003]). When there is
no front end delay, subjects in the laboratory behave as if they have extremely high discount rates
for shorter time horizons of two or three weeks, and that these discount rates decline for longer
planning horizons.
Taken together, these results focus attention squarely on the interpretation of the front end
delay feature of intertemporal choice experiments. This design feature controls for plausible
contaminants of behavior in choice settings such as  the asymmetric credibility of a payment by the
experimenter “today” rather than “in the future” and asymmetric transactions costs to the subject of
collecting the payoffs. It also controls for any other asymmetric subjective costs that the subject may
attach to having to face a delay of any length. Any such subjective costs would result in the demand
for additional compensation in the form of a possible fixed premium for any delay. Although we can
not point to evidence as to why subjects attach a premium (in addition to their required rate of27   The difficulty in designing an experiment to separate these possibilities is clear.  To do so would require a
decision task that involves “now vs. later,” allowing for present-biased preferences to manifest themselves, while keeping
other costs constant between the two choices.  Clearly any choice that involves “now vs. later” must involve at least
some transactions cost (if nothing more than the effort of keeping track of the arrangements needed to receive payment)
and some (however minimal) risk of default in payment.  These difficulties call into question the relevance of drawing
such a distinction in the first place.
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interest) to deferred payment options, there is evidence that this premium affects the compensation
demanded only in choices made in the presence of no front end delay.
There are two ways to interpret the front end delay:
• If the front end delay is viewed as a necessary device to control for the subjective cost
confounds of earlier experiments, then we have shown that one cannot reject the hypothesis
that discount rates are constant over the time horizons considered.
• However, if the front end delay is viewed as controlling for the “passion for the present”
that is presumed in quasi-hyperbolic accounts of intertemporal preference, then our results
show (a) that the “present” does not last longer than one month (or one week in the lab),
and (b) that the discount rates for the “future” are indeed constant.
Which is it? We do not know. Nor do we believe that it is possible to operationally differentiate
between the two.
27 Our priors are that it is the former, hence we reject the alternative hypothesis of
continuously declining discount rates. But we stress, honestly, that this is a matter of our a priori
judgement, just as claims that it is a “passion for the present” are priors that others might hold.
Thus the deciding factor must be the field relevance of the notion of a front end delay. In
public policy settings, we believe it entirely appropriate. In private settings, we can immediately think
of some settings in which it is not appropriate (e.g., diet, or consumption of habituating products
such as smoking), just as we can think of many setting in which it is appropriate (e.g., educational
decisions, housing decisions, family composition decisions, and retirement decisions). Thus, to the
extent that many significant field choices or policy decisions do not involve choices with immediate
payoffs, the use of constant discount rates remains appropriate.-26-





























1 3,000 DKK 3,038 DKK 2.5 2.52   A B
2 3,000 DKK 3,075 DKK 5 5.09   A B
3 3,000 DKK 3,114 DKK 7.5 7.71   A B
4 3,000 DKK 3,152 DKK 10 10.38   A B
5 3,000 DKK 3,190 DKK 12.5 13.1   A B
6 3,000 DKK 3,229 DKK 15 15.87   A B
7 3,000 DKK 3,268 DKK 17.5 18.68   A B
8 3,000 DKK 3,308 DKK 20 21.55   A B
9 3,000 DKK 3,347 DKK 22.5 24.47   A B
10 3,000 DKK 3,387 DKK 25 27.44   A B
11 3,000 DKK 3,427 DKK 27.5 30.47   A B
12 3,000 DKK 3,467 DKK 30 33.55   A B
13 3,000 DKK 3,507 DKK 32.5 36.68   A B
14 3,000 DKK 3,548 DKK 35 39.87   A B
15 3,000 DKK 3,589 DKK 37.5 43.11   A B
16 3,000 DKK 3,630 DKK 40 46.41   A B
17 3,000 DKK 3,671 DKK 42.5 49.77   A B
18 3,000 DKK 3,713 DKK 45 53.18   A B
19 3,000 DKK 3,755 DKK 47.5 56.65   A B
20 3,000 DKK 3,797 DKK 50 60.18   A B-27-
Table 2: Experimental Design
Date of Experiments Horizon in Months Sample Size
Series 1, June 2003 (Base Camp) 1 4 6 12 18 24 253
Series 2, September 2003 (+3 Months) 1 3 9 15 21 26
Series 3, November 2003 (+5 Months) 1 7 13 19 23
Series 4, May 2004 (+ 11 Months) 1 7 13 23
Series 5, November 2004 (+17 Months) 1 7 25-28-
Table 3: List of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Phase I Phase II
Sample Sample
Variable Definition Mean Mean
female Female 0.51 0.53
young Aged less than 30 0.17 0.14
middle Aged between 40 and 50 0.28 0.29
old Aged over 50 0.37 0.39
single Lives alone 0.20 0.16
kids Has children 0.28 0.32
nhhd Number of people in the household 2.49 2.50
owner Owns own home or apartment 0.69 0.67
retired Retired 0.16 0.17
student Student 0.09 0.09
skilled Some post-secondary education 0.38 0.31
longedu Substantial higher education 0.36 0.47
IncLow Lower level income 0.34 0.31
IncHigh Higher level income 0.33 0.40
copen Lives in greater Copenhagen area 0.27 0.27
city Lives in larger city of 20,000 or more 0.39 0.42
experimenter Experimenter Andersen (default is Lau) 0.49 0.54
Number of subjects 253 97
Legend: Most variables have self-evident definitions. The omitted age group is 30-39. Variable “skilled”
indicates if the subject has completed vocational education and training or “short-cycle” higher
education, and variable “longedu” indicates the completion of “medium-cycle” higher education or
“long-cycle” higher education. These terms for the cycle of education are commonly used by Danes
(most short-cycle higher education program last for less than 2 years; medium-cycle higher education
lasts 3 to 4 years, and includes training for occupations such as a journalist, primary and lower
secondary school teacher, nursery and kindergarten teacher, and ordinary nurse; long-cycle higher
education typically lasts 5 years and is offered at Denmark’s five ordinary universities, at the business
schools and various other institutions such as the Technical University of Denmark, the schools of the
Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts, the Academies of Music, the Schools of Architecture and the
Royal Danish School of Pharmacy). Lower incomes are defined in variable “IncLow” by a household
income in 2002 below 300,000 kroner. Higher incomes are defined in variable “IncHigh” by a
household income of 500,000 kroner or more.-29-
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Distribution of mid-point of interval chosen by subject
Series 1 experiments
Figure 1A: Discount Rates by Horizon -- Box Plots-30-
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Distribution of mid-point of interval chosen by subject
Series 2 through 5 experiments
Figure 1B: Discount Rates by Horizon -- Box Plots-31-
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Asterisk denotes Series 1 experiments
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Figure 2: Within-Subject Differences in Discount Rates-33-
Table 4: Regression Model of Within-Subject Differences in Elicited Discount Rates
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       341
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =        11
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        97
                                                  Population size  = 5473963.2
                                                  F(  31,     56)  =      0.78
                                                  Prob > F         =    0.7670
                                                  R-squared        =    0.1589
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
   Hpair_2_4 |   6.115897   12.52979     0.49   0.627    -18.79251     31.0243
   Hpair_2_6 |   5.334726   13.54317     0.39   0.695     -21.5882    32.25765
  Hpair_2_12 |   .4992039   13.39002     0.04   0.970    -26.11928    27.11769
  Hpair_2_18 |   1.518972   12.67531     0.12   0.905     -23.6787    26.71665
  Hpair_2_24 |   .6400804   12.13372     0.05   0.958    -23.48096    24.76112
   Hpair_3_6 |   13.07173   12.27764     1.06   0.290    -11.33542    37.47887
  Hpair_3_12 |   7.802696   11.73943     0.66   0.508    -15.53452    31.13992
  Hpair_3_18 |   3.313218   12.34078     0.27   0.789    -21.21944    27.84588
  Hpair_3_24 |   2.394551   11.79224     0.20   0.840    -21.04765    25.83675
  Hpair_4_12 |   16.42445   13.97168     1.18   0.243    -11.35034    44.19923
  Hpair_4_18 |   13.12725   13.29627     0.99   0.326    -13.30485    39.55935
  Hpair_4_24 |   11.26758   13.55396     0.83   0.408    -15.67679    38.21195
  Hpair_5_18 |   3.895462   12.79405     0.30   0.762    -21.53827    29.32919
  Hpair_5_24 |   2.679303   12.66186     0.21   0.833    -22.49165    27.85025
experimenter |  -7.199596    5.56285    -1.29   0.199    -18.25818    3.858983
      female |  -.9648553   4.358901    -0.22   0.825    -9.630064    7.700353
       young |    1.55538   8.358535     0.19   0.853    -15.06084     18.1716
      middle |   1.642957   6.667744     0.25   0.806    -11.61208    14.89799
         old |  -7.318705   7.710185    -0.95   0.345    -22.64605    8.008635
      single |   1.531458    8.42581     0.18   0.856     -15.2185    18.28141
        kids |   4.959648   6.065616     0.82   0.416    -7.098398    17.01769
        nhhd |  -1.723073   2.512552    -0.69   0.495    -6.717861    3.271715
       owner |  -1.237635   4.863425    -0.25   0.800     -10.9058    8.430535
     retired |  -2.348029   7.577629    -0.31   0.757    -17.41186     12.7158
     student |   17.73226   10.79603     1.64   0.104    -3.729544    39.19407
     skilled |   3.705849   7.032024     0.53   0.600    -10.27335    17.68505
     longedu |    .224232   6.759982     0.03   0.974    -13.21417    13.66263
      IncLow |  -3.844035   7.418023    -0.52   0.606    -18.59058    10.90251
     IncHigh |    .936288   6.866147     0.14   0.892    -12.71316    14.58574
       copen |   2.210342   5.353161     0.41   0.681     -8.43139    12.85207
        city |  -1.723969   5.647373    -0.31   0.761    -12.95057    9.502636
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------34-
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the Changes in States of Nature
Number of observations: 341
Number of individuals: 97
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+----------------
ds_fin0  overall |  .1554252   3.176551        -12         10 |     N =     341
                 |                                            |
ds_exp   overall | -.4281525   2.599485         -7          9 |     N =     341
                 |                                            |
ds_inc   overall | -.3343109   2.007258         -6          6 |     N =     341
                 |                                            |
ds_fin1  overall |  .2932551   2.769941         -6         12 |     N =     341
                 |                                            |
ds_eco   overall |  .4868035   3.797519        -12         12 |     N =     341
                 |                                            |
ds_emp   overall |  .5483871    2.84525        -10          7 |     N =     341
                 |                                            |
ds_int   overall | -1.108504   3.577292        -12          7 |     N =     341
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+----------------
Legend:Variable “ds_fin0” indicates if the subject is better off or worse off financially than he were X months
ago, variable “ds_exp” indicates if the subject expects any major change that will lead to higher
expenses or lower expenses during the next X months, variable “ds_inc” indicates if the subject expects
any major change that will lead to higher earnings or lower earnings during the next X months, variable
“ds_fin1” indicates if the subject thinks that he will be better off or worse off financially X months
from now, variable “ds_eco” indicates if the subject would say that at the present time economic
conditions are better or worse than they were X months ago, variable “ds_emp” indicates if the subject
thinks there will be more or less employment during the next X months, and variable “ds_int” indicates
if the subject thinks that interest rates for borrowing money will go up or down during the next X
months.-35-
Table 6: Regression Model Including Changes in States of Nature
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       341
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =        11
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        97
                                                  Population size  = 5473963.2
                                                  F(  38,     49)  =      1.14
                                                  Prob > F         =    0.3312
                                                  R-squared        =    0.2329
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
   Hpair_2_4 |  -2.566186    13.5208    -0.19   0.850    -29.44465    24.31228
   Hpair_2_6 |  -3.347357   14.19669    -0.24   0.814    -31.56945    24.87474
  Hpair_2_12 |  -8.182879   14.20774    -0.58   0.566    -36.42692    20.06117
  Hpair_2_18 |  -7.163111   13.60495    -0.53   0.600    -34.20886    19.88263
  Hpair_2_24 |  -8.042003   13.10722    -0.61   0.541    -34.09828    18.01428
   Hpair_3_6 |   4.228016   13.16616     0.32   0.749    -21.94544    30.40147
  Hpair_3_12 |  -1.041014   12.89051    -0.08   0.936    -26.66651    24.58448
  Hpair_3_18 |  -5.530493   12.96755    -0.43   0.671    -31.30913    20.24814
  Hpair_3_24 |  -6.449159   12.78042    -0.50   0.615    -31.85579    18.95747
  Hpair_4_12 |   6.276777   13.81552     0.45   0.651    -21.18757    33.74112
  Hpair_4_18 |   2.979578   13.86568     0.21   0.830    -24.58448    30.54363
  Hpair_4_24 |   1.119912   14.14586     0.08   0.937    -27.00112    29.24094
  Hpair_5_18 |  -4.029808   12.81841    -0.31   0.754    -29.51197    21.45235
  Hpair_5_24 |  -5.245966   12.78378    -0.41   0.683    -30.65927    20.16734
experimenter |  -2.199065   4.898299    -0.45   0.655    -11.93656    7.538431
      female |   -1.13321   4.225104    -0.27   0.789    -9.532439    7.266019
       young |   4.949411   10.51914     0.47   0.639    -15.96195    25.86077
      middle |  -1.610132   6.907248    -0.23   0.816    -15.34129    12.12102
         old |  -3.571471   7.067035    -0.51   0.615    -17.62027    10.47733
      single |    3.99864   8.224598     0.49   0.628    -12.35132     20.3486
        kids |   9.541866   6.064591     1.57   0.119    -2.514142    21.59787
        nhhd |   .3598842   2.312471     0.16   0.877    -4.237156    4.956925
       owner |  -.9765377   5.552201    -0.18   0.861    -12.01395    10.06087
     retired |  -2.089204   7.621345    -0.27   0.785    -17.23994    13.06153
     student |   19.17504   10.73014     1.79   0.077    -2.155777    40.50586
     skilled |   2.667989   6.675985     0.40   0.690    -10.60343    15.93941
     longedu |  -2.030967   6.035611    -0.34   0.737    -14.02936     9.96743
      IncLow |  -2.771109   7.298713    -0.38   0.705    -17.28047    11.73825
     IncHigh |   2.528066   7.107635     0.36   0.723    -11.60144    16.65758
       copen |   3.419973   4.835127     0.71   0.481    -6.191941    13.03189
        city |  -1.882499   4.885864    -0.39   0.701    -11.59528    7.830277
     Ds_fin0 |   .4817763   .8327758     0.58   0.564    -1.173727     2.13728
      Ds_exp |   .5190432   .9958566     0.52   0.604    -1.460654    2.498741
      Ds_inc |   .8953618   .9002528     0.99   0.323    -.8942814    2.685005
     Ds_fin1 |  -.6854827   .8260446    -0.83   0.409    -2.327605    .9566397
      Ds_eco |  -1.962495   .6102994    -3.22   0.002     -3.17573   -.7492602
      Ds_emp |   1.039194   .7074027     1.47   0.145    -.3670756    2.445464
      Ds_int |   .3863497   .6568838     0.59   0.558     -.919492    1.692191
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------36-
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Appendix A: Additional Statistical Results (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
These regression results should be compared to those in Table 4. They represent the same
model, but estimated on the sub-population indicated. Given the survey design employed, the
estimation procedure employed here actually utilizes data from the entire sample to correctly calculate
the coefficients and standard errors for the sub-population. The sample size for the 4-month horizon
in which we include changes in the state of nature does not have sufficient degrees of freedom for
reliable estimation, and is therefore not reported below.-39-
Table A1: Regression Analysis for 4-Month Horizon Only
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       142
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =         4
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        32
                                                  Population size  = 2342566.7
                                                  F(  17,     12)  =         .
Subpopulation no. of obs =        26              Prob > F         =         .
Subpopulation size       =  432496.9              R-squared        =    0.6712
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
   Hpair_2_4 |   43.26093   41.94996     1.03   0.311    -42.66967    129.1915
experimenter |   7.521802   14.12427     0.53   0.599    -21.41045    36.45406
      female |   2.638318   8.205368     0.32   0.750    -14.16962    19.44625
       young |  -16.94052   47.47879    -0.36   0.724    -114.1964    80.31537
      middle |    3.43273   11.77881     0.29   0.773    -20.69506    27.56052
         old |   19.29943   18.71664     1.03   0.311    -19.03986    57.63873
      single |  -5.027227   20.70388    -0.24   0.810    -47.43721    37.38276
        kids |   34.27513   19.28947     1.78   0.086    -5.237558    73.78781
        nhhd |  -15.86026   7.332798    -2.16   0.039    -30.88081    -.839701
       owner |   8.077212   13.42501     0.60   0.552    -19.42268     35.5771
     retired |  -64.78028   23.43401    -2.76   0.010    -112.7827   -16.77788
     student |   29.14113   13.66524     2.13   0.042     1.149156    57.13311
     skilled |  -9.495323   29.53642    -0.32   0.750    -69.99793    51.00729
     longedu |  -24.30824   10.90373    -2.23   0.034    -46.64352   -1.972962
      IncLow |  -.8603927   28.11752    -0.03   0.976    -58.45652    56.73573
     IncHigh |  -30.14416   16.30625    -1.85   0.075    -63.54599    3.257678
       copen |   16.24521   10.77708     1.51   0.143    -5.830644    38.32107
        city |    19.9449   10.00515     1.99   0.056    -.5497313    40.43953
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------40-
Table A2: Regression Analysis for 6-Month Horizon Only
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       282
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =         8
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        73
                                                  Population size  = 4844778.6
                                                  F(  19,     47)  =      1.10
Subpopulation no. of obs =        49              Prob > F         =    0.3794
Subpopulation size       =  822780.2              R-squared        =    0.2837
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
   Hpair_2_6 |   3.906378   36.71105     0.11   0.916    -69.41065    77.22341
   Hpair_3_6 |   10.21446   37.76121     0.27   0.788     -65.1999    85.62881
experimenter |  -2.935683   8.884454    -0.33   0.742    -20.67916     14.8078
      female |   -10.2585   8.051776    -1.27   0.207    -26.33901    5.822008
       young |   37.66837   36.87318     1.02   0.311    -35.97245    111.3092
      middle |   4.924201   18.81122     0.26   0.794     -32.6444     42.4928
         old |  -8.552866   26.12454    -0.33   0.744    -60.72718    43.62144
      single |   5.535708   19.29223     0.29   0.775    -32.99353    44.06495
        kids |   1.975745   17.29325     0.11   0.909    -32.56126    36.51275
        nhhd |  -3.620084   5.634561    -0.64   0.523    -14.87308    7.632912
       owner |   8.800345   13.27003     0.66   0.510    -17.70174    35.30243
     retired |  -16.49871   10.98994    -1.50   0.138    -38.44713     5.44971
     student |   .5229717   25.64481     0.02   0.984    -50.69325    51.73919
     skilled |   7.463489   15.48185     0.48   0.631    -23.45591    38.38289
     longedu |   1.086897   12.69666     0.09   0.932    -24.27008    26.44387
      IncLow |  -15.09036   12.90897    -1.17   0.247    -40.87136    10.69065
     IncHigh |   5.971815    12.1654     0.49   0.625    -18.32418     30.2678
       copen |   2.609906   11.12138     0.23   0.815    -19.60103    24.82084
        city |   4.115909   10.36433     0.40   0.693    -16.58308     24.8149
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------41-
Table A3: Regression Analysis for 12-Month Horizon Only
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       315
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =        10
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        84
                                                  Population size  =   5198001
                                                  F(  20,     55)  =      1.16
Subpopulation no. of obs =        72              Prob > F         =    0.3215
Subpopulation size       = 1169386.5              R-squared        =    0.2835
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  Hpair_2_12 |   17.42383    12.1625     1.43   0.156    -6.810494    41.65815
  Hpair_3_12 |    24.8416   11.73903     2.12   0.038     1.451076    48.23213
  Hpair_4_12 |    21.7271   12.84187     1.69   0.095    -3.860888    47.31508
experimenter |   -5.18943   5.889797    -0.88   0.381    -16.92511    6.546247
      female |   3.402451   5.051478     0.67   0.503    -6.662837    13.46774
       young |  -10.89186   8.804013    -1.24   0.220    -28.43424     6.65052
      middle |  -12.64597   8.308959    -1.52   0.132    -29.20194     3.90999
         old |  -23.73089   10.55791    -2.25   0.028      -44.768   -2.693789
      single |  -2.845906   8.850657    -0.32   0.749    -20.48122    14.78941
        kids |   -12.6746   7.193425    -1.76   0.082    -27.00781    1.658612
        nhhd |  -1.780957   2.358695    -0.76   0.453     -6.48076    2.918846
       owner |  -3.343441   4.978669    -0.67   0.504    -13.26366    6.576772
     retired |   -1.29042   8.250914    -0.16   0.876    -17.73073    15.14989
     student |  -8.791733   15.60392    -0.56   0.575    -39.88322    22.29976
     skilled |   7.433238   7.574066     0.98   0.330    -7.658419    22.52489
     longedu |  -2.894381   7.667932    -0.38   0.707    -18.17307    12.38431
      IncLow |   8.709371   8.037011     1.08   0.282    -7.304723    24.72346
     IncHigh |    3.94359   7.575723     0.52   0.604    -11.15137    19.03855
       copen |   7.872946   5.634084     1.40   0.166    -3.353211     19.0991
        city |   -7.32094    5.04133    -1.45   0.151    -17.36601    2.724128
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------42-
Table A4: Regression Analysis for 18-Month Horizon Only
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       341
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =        11
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        97
                                                  Population size  = 5473963.2
                                                  F(  21,     66)  =      1.00
Subpopulation no. of obs =        97              Prob > F         =    0.4714
Subpopulation size       = 1524649.8              R-squared        =    0.1840
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  Hpair_2_18 |  -11.09285   16.01968    -0.69   0.491    -42.93891    20.75322
  Hpair_3_18 |  -6.795508    14.3993    -0.47   0.638    -35.42037    21.82936
  Hpair_4_18 |   6.706997   16.47549     0.41   0.685    -26.04519    39.45919
  Hpair_5_18 |  -3.696854   15.94833    -0.23   0.817    -35.40107    28.00737
experimenter |  -12.45005   7.010052    -1.78   0.079    -26.38557     1.48547
      female |  -2.520309   5.327792    -0.47   0.637    -13.11161    8.070992
       young |   4.491953    9.61185     0.47   0.641    -14.61577    23.59968
      middle |   5.024171   7.803481     0.64   0.521    -10.48864    20.53698
         old |  -3.062801   9.106846    -0.34   0.737    -21.16661    15.04101
      single |   4.270913   10.49719     0.41   0.685    -16.59681    25.13864
        kids |   14.58196   7.184542     2.03   0.045     .2995666    28.86436
        nhhd |  -.7939397   3.078095    -0.26   0.797     -6.91299     5.32511
       owner |   1.627256   6.312898     0.26   0.797    -10.92237    14.17688
     retired |   5.371876   9.697708     0.55   0.581    -13.90653    24.65028
     student |   23.86789    10.9962     2.17   0.033     2.008172     45.7276
     skilled |   6.508764   8.143582     0.80   0.426    -9.680141    22.69767
     longedu |   2.997287   8.117473     0.37   0.713    -13.13972    19.13429
      IncLow |   -7.54346   8.978882    -0.84   0.403    -25.39289    10.30597
     IncHigh |  -.2187955   8.446397    -0.03   0.979    -17.00968    16.57209
       copen |   .7280599    6.99486     0.10   0.917    -13.17726    14.63338
        city |   .0833522   7.208419     0.01   0.991    -14.24651    14.41322
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------43-
Table A5: Regression Analysis for 24-Month Horizon Only
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       341
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =        11
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        97
                                                  Population size  = 5473963.2
                                                  F(  21,     66)  =      0.88
Subpopulation no. of obs =        97              Prob > F         =    0.6169
Subpopulation size       = 1524649.8              R-squared        =    0.1987
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  Hpair_2_24 |  -4.211588   13.91491    -0.30   0.763    -31.87352    23.45034
  Hpair_3_24 |  -.1300271   12.74506    -0.01   0.992    -25.46636    25.20631
  Hpair_4_24 |   7.238356   14.93551     0.48   0.629    -22.45245    36.92916
  Hpair_5_24 |   .2684235    14.0477     0.02   0.985    -27.65747    28.19432
experimenter |  -8.660197   5.836121    -1.48   0.141    -20.26202    2.941627
      female |    .812927   4.832367     0.17   0.867      -8.7935    10.41935
       young |   3.063827   9.797615     0.31   0.755    -16.41319    22.54084
      middle |   2.185824   6.432108     0.34   0.735    -10.60078    14.97243
         old |  -6.523605   8.385883    -0.78   0.439    -23.19419    10.14698
      single |   1.359593   9.130053     0.15   0.882    -16.79035    19.50954
        kids |   5.122729   6.353972     0.81   0.422    -7.508549    17.75401
        nhhd |  -.5256916   2.490982    -0.21   0.833    -5.477599    4.426216
       owner |  -5.555975   5.686504    -0.98   0.331    -16.86037     5.74842
     retired |   4.819042   9.507818     0.51   0.614    -14.08187    23.71996
     student |   17.28603    8.11339     2.13   0.036     1.157147    33.41492
     skilled |   5.157873   7.387551     0.70   0.487    -9.528091    19.84384
     longedu |   2.280192   7.744357     0.29   0.769    -13.11508    17.67547
      IncLow |  -.1115703   8.027746    -0.01   0.989     -16.0702    15.84706
     IncHigh |   4.824554   7.005536     0.69   0.493     -9.10199     18.7511
       copen |   -1.72816   5.679515    -0.30   0.762    -13.01866    9.562342
        city |  -5.408757   6.136521    -0.88   0.381    -17.60776    6.790243
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Table A6: Regression Analysis for 6-Month Horizon With Changes in States of Nature
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       282
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =         8
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        73
                                                  Population size  = 4844778.6
                                                  F(  26,     40)  =      2.49
Subpopulation no. of obs =        49              Prob > F         =    0.0046
Subpopulation size       =  822780.2              R-squared        =    0.3878
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
   Hpair_2_6 |  -8.240439   40.45173    -0.20   0.839    -89.02813    72.54725
   Hpair_3_6 |   -4.00827   40.21823    -0.10   0.921    -84.32961    76.31307
experimenter |   10.73071   8.528238     1.26   0.213     -6.30136    27.76277
      female |  -6.951046   7.434566    -0.93   0.353     -21.7989    7.896808
       young |   50.49849   32.49228     1.55   0.125    -14.39307    115.3901
      middle |   1.457331   19.38843     0.08   0.940    -37.26404     40.1787
         old |   .6449682   22.89446     0.03   0.978    -45.07842    46.36836
      single |   9.444289   20.41847     0.46   0.645     -31.3342    50.22278
        kids |   20.36114   14.30898     1.42   0.160    -8.215869    48.93814
        nhhd |  -.3130829   6.643646    -0.05   0.963    -13.58136    12.95519
       owner |   3.879523   11.82336     0.33   0.744    -19.73336     27.4924
     retired |  -8.788195   12.72312    -0.69   0.492    -34.19801    16.62162
     student |   5.116553   27.10502     0.19   0.851    -49.01591    59.24902
     skilled |  -2.791227   15.16062    -0.18   0.855    -33.06908    27.48663
     longedu |  -2.411531   11.64303    -0.21   0.837    -25.66426     20.8412
      IncLow |  -16.12484   13.38516    -1.20   0.233    -42.85684    10.60717
     IncHigh |   .0925229   14.65526     0.01   0.995    -29.17605    29.36109
       copen |  -3.542016   11.35983    -0.31   0.756    -26.22917    19.14513
        city |   -2.08904   9.385989    -0.22   0.825    -20.83416    16.65607
     Ds_fin0 |   .8912056   1.864084     0.48   0.634    -2.831627    4.614038
      Ds_exp |   2.357029    2.34211     1.01   0.318    -2.320488    7.034545
      Ds_inc |  -2.036687   2.011817    -1.01   0.315    -6.054564    1.981189
     Ds_fin1 |  -2.162412    1.40061    -1.54   0.127    -4.959623    .6347987
      Ds_eco |  -2.381932   1.410246    -1.69   0.096    -5.198387    .4345236
      Ds_emp |    2.73692   1.421553     1.93   0.059    -.1021179    5.575958
      Ds_int |   .1842693   .8806872     0.21   0.835    -1.574584    1.943123
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Table A7: Regression Analysis for 12-Month Horizon With Changes in States of Nature
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       315
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =        10
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        84
                                                  Population size  =   5198001
                                                  F(  27,     48)  =      1.22
Subpopulation no. of obs =        72              Prob > F         =    0.2666
Subpopulation size       = 1169386.5              R-squared        =    0.3925
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  Hpair_2_12 |   7.357398   11.89146     0.62   0.538    -16.33686    31.05166
  Hpair_3_12 |   13.83922   12.42315     1.11   0.269    -10.91444    38.59288
  Hpair_4_12 |   8.204935   12.56853     0.65   0.516     -16.8384    33.24827
experimenter |    3.78884   6.009445     0.63   0.530     -8.18524    15.76292
      female |   2.596878   4.435297     0.59   0.560    -6.240644     11.4344
       young |  -4.430641   12.16506    -0.36   0.717    -28.67005    19.80876
      middle |  -17.80669   8.834563    -2.02   0.047    -35.40994   -.2034393
         old |  -19.43788   10.41941    -1.87   0.066      -40.199    1.323241
      single |  -4.206653   9.458126    -0.44   0.658    -23.05238    14.63908
        kids |  -8.091924   7.532703    -1.07   0.286    -23.10116    6.917315
        nhhd |   .0123156   2.104338     0.01   0.995    -4.180669      4.2053
       owner |  -.5472022   5.638873    -0.10   0.923     -11.7829     10.6885
     retired |  -1.523601   8.595919    -0.18   0.860    -18.65134    15.60414
     student |  -8.512197   14.36456    -0.59   0.555     -37.1342    20.10981
     skilled |   4.715012   7.278986     0.65   0.519    -9.788684    19.21871
     longedu |   -6.85413   6.284414    -1.09   0.279     -19.3761    5.667838
      IncLow |   10.35054   7.348295     1.41   0.163    -4.291262    24.99233
     IncHigh |   6.206864   8.095224     0.77   0.446    -9.923222    22.33695
       copen |   10.18758   5.268482     1.93   0.057    -.3100975    20.68526
        city |  -5.266468   4.226605    -1.25   0.217    -13.68816    3.155227
     Ds_fin0 |   1.178388   1.073133     1.10   0.276    -.9598767    3.316653
      Ds_exp |  -.2549892   1.092395    -0.23   0.816    -2.431634    1.921655
      Ds_inc |    1.79875   1.287663     1.40   0.167    -.7669743    4.364475
     Ds_fin1 |  -.7321967    .854729    -0.86   0.394    -2.435281     .970888
      Ds_eco |  -1.940203   .6263944    -3.10   0.003    -3.188321   -.6920848
      Ds_emp |   1.105468   .9216863     1.20   0.234    -.7310325    2.941968
      Ds_int |   1.198202   .7739887     1.55   0.126    -.3440044    2.740408
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Table A8: Regression Analysis for 18-Month Horizon With Changes in States of Nature
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       341
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =        11
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        97
                                                  Population size  = 5473963.2
                                                  F(  28,     59)  =      1.09
Subpopulation no. of obs =        97              Prob > F         =    0.3853
Subpopulation size       = 1524649.8              R-squared        =    0.2876
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  Hpair_2_18 |  -22.39274   17.53402    -1.28   0.205    -57.24922    12.46374
  Hpair_3_18 |  -18.38869   16.01675    -1.15   0.254    -50.22894    13.45156
  Hpair_4_18 |  -6.012663   18.06488    -0.33   0.740    -41.92446    29.89913
  Hpair_5_18 |  -13.08274   16.64557    -0.79   0.434    -46.17304    20.00756
experimenter |  -8.303125    6.37873    -1.30   0.196    -20.98362     4.37737
      female |  -2.930868   5.318048    -0.55   0.583     -13.5028    7.641062
       young |   7.024645   11.65678     0.60   0.548    -16.14827    30.19756
      middle |   3.191914   7.938113     0.40   0.689    -12.58853    18.97236
         old |   2.127491   8.163698     0.26   0.795     -14.1014    18.35639
      single |   6.170962    10.3807     0.59   0.554    -14.46519    26.80711
        kids |   17.10762   7.067306     2.42   0.018     3.058281    31.15696
        nhhd |   1.735016   2.919159     0.59   0.554    -4.068081    7.538113
       owner |   1.680719    7.49698     0.22   0.823    -13.22278    16.58422
     retired |   4.084491   9.305268     0.44   0.662    -14.41377    22.58275
     student |   23.81778   11.41839     2.09   0.040     1.118773    46.51679
     skilled |    5.66358   8.183126     0.69   0.491    -10.60394     21.9311
     longedu |   2.275006   7.599125     0.30   0.765    -12.83156    17.38157
      IncLow |   -3.05717   9.205904    -0.33   0.741     -21.3579    15.24356
     IncHigh |   1.928781   8.602443     0.22   0.823    -15.17231    19.02987
       copen |   2.882345   6.160513     0.47   0.641    -9.364351    15.12904
        city |     .38131   6.689746     0.06   0.955    -12.91747    13.68009
     Ds_fin0 |   .8637979   .9754115     0.89   0.378    -1.075256    2.802852
      Ds_exp |   .1097021   1.266488     0.09   0.931    -2.407992    2.627396
      Ds_inc |   1.130173   1.112439     1.02   0.313    -1.081283    3.341628
     Ds_fin1 |  -.8094637   1.050446    -0.77   0.443    -2.897681    1.278754
      Ds_eco |  -2.374397   .8604921    -2.76   0.007    -4.084998    -.663795
      Ds_emp |     .71599   .8554393     0.84   0.405    -.9845671    2.416547
      Ds_int |   .3849213   .9067492     0.42   0.672    -1.417636    2.187479
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Table A9: Regression Analysis for 24-Month Horizon With Changes in States of Nature
pweight:  weight                                  Number of obs    =       341
Strata:   county                                  Number of strata =        11
PSU:      id                                      Number of PSUs   =        97
                                                  Population size  = 5473963.2
                                                  F(  28,     59)  =      0.99
Subpopulation no. of obs =        97              Prob > F         =    0.4960
Subpopulation size       = 1524649.8              R-squared        =    0.2813
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 cenidr_diff |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
  Hpair_2_24 |  -7.733469    15.8409    -0.49   0.627    -39.22414     23.7572
  Hpair_3_24 |  -1.939289   14.46224    -0.13   0.894    -30.68927    26.81069
  Hpair_4_24 |   2.606948   16.91827     0.15   0.878    -31.02547    36.23936
  Hpair_5_24 |  -3.210422   15.01701    -0.21   0.831    -33.06325     26.6424
experimenter |  -6.877976   5.015439    -1.37   0.174    -16.84834    3.092386
      female |  -.7193629    4.97992    -0.14   0.885    -10.61912    9.180391
       young |  -.1100479   10.22068    -0.01   0.991    -20.42809    20.20799
      middle |  -1.304833   6.406563    -0.20   0.839    -14.04066    11.43099
         old |  -4.360163   7.636342    -0.57   0.570    -19.54071    10.82038
      single |   3.956499   9.017731     0.44   0.662    -13.97016    21.88316
        kids |   6.705362   6.269981     1.07   0.288    -5.758948    19.16967
        nhhd |   .8510131   2.493798     0.34   0.734    -4.106493    5.808519
       owner |  -5.463285   6.396119    -0.85   0.395    -18.17835    7.251779
     retired |   2.302383   9.363704     0.25   0.806    -16.31205    20.91681
     student |   20.29348    8.50889     2.38   0.019     3.378363    37.20859
     skilled |   5.432709    7.74988     0.70   0.485    -9.973543    20.83896
     longedu |   .8266985   7.968691     0.10   0.918    -15.01453    16.66793
      IncLow |    .861093    8.86761     0.10   0.923    -16.76713    18.48932
     IncHigh |   6.963735   6.819852     1.02   0.310    -6.593683    20.52115
       copen |  -.5919685   5.226561    -0.11   0.910    -10.98203     9.79809
        city |  -5.766352   5.719256    -1.01   0.316    -17.13586    5.603154
     Ds_fin0 |   .1443199    .883515     0.16   0.871     -1.61205     1.90069
      Ds_exp |  -.0563692   .9775722    -0.06   0.954    -1.999718     1.88698
      Ds_inc |   1.581726   1.088793     1.45   0.150     -.582723    3.746175
     Ds_fin1 |  -.1006795   1.045412    -0.10   0.924     -2.17889    1.977531
      Ds_eco |  -1.768978     .81316    -2.18   0.032    -3.385487   -.1524699
      Ds_emp |   1.320741   .7757092     1.70   0.092     -.221318      2.8628
      Ds_int |   .0905562   .6668893     0.14   0.892    -1.235176    1.416288
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------48-
Appendix B: Additional Discussion of Experimental Design Choices
 (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Our goal is to place the existing empirical findings in context, so that we can see when and
why non-constant discount rates emerge, and the implications for dynamic consistency. The panel
feature of experimental design is, we believe, novel in the setting of discount rate experiments that
involve real rewards. Our single-stage experimental design differs from much of the previous literature
in some respects, although each of the key features has been employed previously in other
experiments. We review each of these features.
A. Use of a Front End Delay
The most important design feature is that we employ a FED on the choices presented to
subjects in order to control for any confounding effects from fixed premia due to transactions costs. It
is important to recognize that the use of this FED means that we cannot differentiate between “quasi-
hyperbolic preferences” and “exponential preferences,” and that we do not believe that any credible
design can do so.
O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999; p.103] motivate their analysis of time-inconsistent preferences
with the following passage:
People are impatient — they like to experience rewards soon and to delay costs until
later. Economists almost always capture impatience by assuming that people discount
streams of utility over time exponentially. Such preferences are time-consistent: A
person’s relative preference for well-being at an earlier date over a later date is the
same no matter when she is asked.
Casual observation, introspection, and psychological research all suggest that the
assumption of time consistency is importantly wrong. It ignores the human tendency
to grab immediate rewards and to avoid immediate costs in a way that our ‘‘long-run
selves’’ do not appreciate. For example, when presented a choice between doing seven
hours of an unpleasant activity on April 1 versus eight hours on April 15, if asked on
February 1 virtually everyone would prefer the seven hours on April 1. But come April
1, given the same choice, most of us are apt to put off the work until April 15. We call
such tendencies present-biased preferences: When considering trade-offs between two
future moments, present-biased preferences give stronger relative weight to the earlier
moment as it gets closer. (Footnotes omitted)
This passage seems to confound two things, each of which are important. The first is whether the28 Holcomb and Nelson [1992] re-examine the role of a FED with monetary payoffs, motivated by a concern
that Benzion, Rapaport and Yagil [1989] only studied hypothetical choices. Their FED was only one day, so it is not
obvious that the subjects viewed this as substantially different from there being no FED. They observed no apparent
effect of the one-day FED on behavior.
29 It could be that credibility in the mind of the subject is a decreasing function of the time between the
experiment and the next payoff. Hence an experiment with a FED of 10 years would be tantamount to a hypothetical
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length of the time horizon over which the discount rate is being elicited affects the discount rate, such
as it does with continuously hyperbolic preferences. The second is whether the discount rate elicited
with a FED is different than a discount rate elicited with no FED, i.e. whether preferences are quasi-
hyperbolic. For an experimenter, and for subjects evaluating the credibility of being paid, these are
very different questions. The formal analysis of O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999] employs quasi-
hyperbolic preferences, which do not suffer from these confounds.
Building on Coller and Williams [1999] and Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002], our single-
stage design is intended to separate the effects of the FED from the pure effects of the length of the
time horizon. The potential importance of this distinction seems to have been first noticed by
Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil [1989].
28 It was also highlighted by Roberts [1991; p.344], in the context
of comments on Ainslie and Haendel [1983] and Winston and Woodbury [1991]:
There is a bias toward choosing the small-early reward, particularly in the study by
Ainslie and Haendel [1983] where real money changed hands. Ainslie and Haendel find
ridiculously high implicit interest rates. An individual who prefers $10 today to $12.50
three days from now is turning down a rate of return that is a compounded annual rate
of well over a trillion percent. Ainslie and Haendel, in a passage quoted by Winston
and Woodbury, suggest that this is how people behave in one-time events and is not
inconsistent with people willing to put money in a savings account at 5 percent - a
repetitive activity. 
An alternative explanation is that Ainslie and Haendel have revealed the role of
uncertainty in experiments lasting more than a single day. A student is likely to prefer
$10 today to $12.50 in three days if there is some uncertainty about whether the
experimenters will return in three days. I suspect that if respondents saw the
experimenters consistently handing out money three days later at 25 percent interest
rates so that they could be convinced that the experimenters were a going concern,
they would take the larger return and not act as if they required scientific notation to
express their discount rate. 
One important reason that the FED design was introduced into discount rate experiments is
the concern about differential credibility. While it may not completely solve the potential credibility
problem,
29 it arguably mitigates it. For example, consider a FED of 30 days such that subjects chooseexperiment in most settings. Conversely, a FED of 5 minutes would be the same as having no FED.
30 This assumes no dramatic change in circumstances that makes collecting the payment more difficult later. 
For this reason, we are careful to only offer choices that pay off on a week day during the  current teaching semester.
31 Such settings might include individual decisions of whether to consume now or save for future consumption,
or to purchase a more expensive but energy efficient appliance. We believe that individual decisions involving more
significant sums of money or public policy decisions are better characterized as having a FED. 
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between receiving different payment amounts in 30 days and in 60 days. While the subject may have
some doubt about actually receiving payment in 30 days, this doubt is not likely to differ much from
the doubt about receiving payment in 60 days. Similarly, the FED equalizes transactions costs between
the two payment options. While there are some costs to returning at a later date to receive payment,
these costs are not likely to differ between returning in 30 days vs. returning in 60 days.
30 The FED
also serves to equalize any other unspecified differences subjects may perceive between the two
payment options. For example, if subjects have a “passion for the present,” they demand a premium
in order to accept a delay of any length. In a choice between immediate payment and delayed payment,
this premium is attached only to the delayed payment. However, if both payments are delayed, the
premium applies to both choices and thus becomes irrelevant in choosing between them.
Having said this, there are many field settings in which the relevant issue is what the discount
rate is for “money today” versus “money in the future.”
31 Even if the experimenter faces the
inferential problem of having to then tease apart the effects of time horizon from credibility,
transactions, or other subjective costs, it is entirely appropriate that experiments with no FED be
considered. If there is a finding that discount rates are not constant when there is no FED, then it is a
matter for interpretation as to whether this is a subjective differential cost effect or a time-
inconsistency effect (or both).
Evidence for the behavioral importance of a 30-day FED was provided by Coller and Williams
[1999]. In one of their experimental treatments they had no such delay, and the results from those
experiments can be directly compared to their other experiments. After some minor modifications to
their statistical analysis, their results provide evidence that the use of a FED decreases elicited rates by
a large amount. The average effect of having no FED is to increase elicited rates by 28 percentage
points, with a 95% confidence interval between 52 percentage points and 3 percentage points; the-51-
coefficient on the dummy variable denoting this treatment is statistically significant at the 4.8% level.
Read [2001] develops an experimental design which includes a FED, and finds that it increases
the elicited discount rate (reported as a decline in the discount factor) in the one experiment in which
he used salient monetary rewards. Unfortunately, the method he uses to elicit discount rates is not
incentive compatible, and he was obliged to drop some subjects that appeared to have exploited this
flaw by claiming that they always preferred the shorter horizon option. Even if some subjects did not
exploit the flaw to the point where they were dropped, it is possible that they were aware of it and
inflated their responses to a point that they thought would not be detected. Either way, there are
obvious problems of control over incentives to truthfully reveal discount rates. His design also
examined only one horizon (8 months for the non-salient experiments, and 6 months for the salient
experiment), making it difficult to tell if the effect of the FED persisted across other time horizons,
which is the focus of our design; the same limitation applies to the design of Coller and Williams
[1999].
Kirby and Santiesteban [2003] use a FED of 1 day in an experiment in which they elicited the
individual discount rates of financially-motivated subjects for horizons of between 1 and 43 days. They
compare results with comparable experiments using no FED, and find that there is essentially no
difference in the pattern: discount rates decline with time horizon. These results are valuable, and
accord with our priors. They show that 1 day appears to be insufficient to overcome the subjective
costs and resulting fixed premium we hypothesize.
B. Hypothetical Responses
One major difference in experimental design between the experiments reported here and most
of the existing literature is our use of real, rather than hypothetical, payments. One of the hallmarks of
experimental economics is the use of instructions and payoffs designed to ensure control over the
incentives faced by individuals. This control facilitates interpretation in terms of existing theory. One
aspect of control is the use of payoffs to the subject that vary with the responses made by the subject,
and in a way that the subject understands. This is called “salience” in the terminology of Smith [1982].32 Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue [2002] review the literature.
33 See the review in Harrison and Rutström [2005] of valuation tasks designed to test for hypothetical bias.
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It is also important that these payoffs be observable and measurable by the experimenter, thus ruling
out “intrinsic motivation” as a candidate explanation for observed behavior. We cannot rely on
subjects’ personal desires to do the task correctly for their own satisfaction, since that is not
observable and subjects may differ in this regard. Hence monetary rewards are customarily used by
experimental economists to motivate subjects.
The existing literature relies heavily on responses to hypothetical choice situations which do
not employ salient monetary incentives.
32 While hypothetical scenarios may be entirely appropriate in
some contexts, the argument offered in favor of using hypothetical scenarios in many studies is simply
convenience. The notion here is that there are certain “realistic” questions which one cannot feasibly
ask within the usual constraints of budgets and ethical review boards. 
Loewenstein and Thaler [1989; p. 184] offer the following argument in favor of using
hypothetical choice scenarios:
In this study, and some others described here, the questions asked were hypothetical.
Of course, all things being equal it would be better to study actual choices. However,
there are serious trade-offs between hypothetical and real money methods. Using
hypothetical questions one can ask subjects to consider options that incorporate large
amounts of money, both gains and losses, and delays of a year or more. In studies
using real choices, the experimenter must reduce the size of the stakes and the length
of the delay, and it is difficult to investigate actual losses. Also, in a hypothetical
question, one can ask the subject to assume that there is no risk associated with future
payments, while in experiments using real stakes, subjects must assess the
experimenter’s credibility. 
The flexibility made possible by using hypothetical payments prompt Loewenstein and Thaler [1989]
to utilize a hypothetical scenario in their study. However, they acknowledge that real choices made in
the presence of economic incentives are more credible. It is only when the research question
necessitates the use of unaffordably large prizes, or runs counter to ethical constraints which prohibit
the imposition of losses, that hypothetical responses are reasonable substitutes for real ones. Because
sufficient evidence
33 exists that hypothetical responses can be misleading in valuation and choice
settings of interest to economists, we choose not to rely on inferences made from hypothetical-53-
choices. 
C. Eliciting Truthful Responses
An important aspect of salience is the understanding that subjects have for the way in which
payoffs are affected by their decisions. Furthermore, for payoffs to be salient, subjects must feel
confident that the earned payoffs will actually be received. A second important design consideration
that distinguishes the experiments reported here from many others is the effort to ensure credibility
and to provide a simple, incentive compatible payment mechanism. 
Problems with credibility and subject understanding can greatly limit the inferences drawn
from any experiment. For example, Horowitz [1991; p.320] honestly reports problems with
experimental control that should cause some pause about accepting his results:
If anything, the results reported in this paper understate how unusual the behavior was
in our experiment. [...]  First, the winners of Auctions 1 and 2 were extremely reluctant
to pay for their bonds. Two out of six of the bond purchasers refused to pay for the
bonds they were supposed to buy; the four other winners all had elaborate excuses for
their inability to pay for the bonds immediately and took as long as a week to pay
eventually. This reaction was especially pronounced in Auction 2. 
Second, a dramatic change in bidding behavior was observed between Auction 1 and
Auction 2. Over 55 percent (40 out of 70) of the participants were willing to pay less
for the second bond than they were for the first one, despite the fact that the payoff
date was 30 days closer. The four winners of the first auction bid especially low in the
second. Two of them submitted bids of $0 and one submitted a bid of $5.00; the
fourth winner dropped the class between the two auction dates. In scrutinizing the
reliability of our data, one might argue that a single auction (Auction 1) is insufficient
to familiarize individuals with the auction mechanism or the tradeoffs involved with
our bonds. But the striking change in behavior between Auctions 1 and 2 suggests that
individuals learned a lot from Auction 1.
The credibility of the payoffs is an issue that was also recognized by Neill, Cummings, Ganderton,
Harrison and McGucken [1994] in experiments designed to elicit real payments for a physical good (an
art object). They addressed it by modifying the experimental procedures for their Vickrey auction by
requiring subjects to include the cash or a check for their bid in an envelope, to make their bid
effective. The losers would have their envelopes returned unopened, and the winner would simply be
refunded the difference between their bid and the second-highest bid. Quite apart from ensuring that34 Specifically, the experimenter would have to assume that the subject followed a symmetric Nash Equilibrium
offer function, relating his offer to the number of active subjects in the auction and the range of possible valuations that
individuals could have drawn. In addition, some assumptions about risk attitudes would need to be made. In the simplest
case of a first-price sealed-bid auction with risk neutral bidders and valuations drawn from the unit interval, the Nash
Equilibrium bidding rule is for the subject to bid a fraction of his valuation, equal to the number of bidders minus one,
divided by the number of bidders. Hence one could just invert this fraction, multiply it by the observed bid, and infer the
true valuation. Quite apart from the plausibility of these auxiliary assumptions being true for these subjects, the first-price
auction is known to provide weak incentives to the subject to reveal the optimal bid accurately.
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the experimenter received some real payment from the winner for the object sold, this procedural
device undoubtedly clarified for all subjects that there were real consequences of their bid. In this
manner, control over incentives was regained.
Kirby and Marakoviƒ [1995] used real rewards for their subjects in discount rate experiments
in which the subjects were asked to state an amount of money they would accept immediately in
exchange for a deferred payment. The auction institution used was a first-price sealed-offer auction, in
which the subjects were told that the winner would be the person that offered the smallest amount
and that the winner would receive that amount instead of the deferred payment. The first-price
auction is not one in which subjects have a rational incentive to reveal their true value, although it
could be inferred by the experimenter with some strong auxiliary assumptions.
34 Another problem was
that the actual procedures for payments were quite different than the procedures explained to subjects:
“In fact, the auction was entirely simulated and subjects’ bids were never really compared. The
computer randomly determined whether the subject “won” the bid with a probability inversely related
to the size of the bid.” (p. 24). One might say that this is immaterial since the subjects did not know
this, but such deception calls into question the credibility of anything that the experimenter has to say
to the subject.
Both of these concerns were addressed in an important follow-up study by Kirby [1997]. This
study does use procedures that meet the salience standards of experimental economics. The subjects
were provided real rewards, and were required to come to the experiment with $20 in cash to use for
bidding (p.59). He also employed an example, patterned after Neill et al. [1994], in which an auction
for a used car was used to explain the notion that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy. Finally, he35 His experiment 3 provided this information to 2 of the 4 bidders in each trial; neither of his previous
experiments provided any feedback. The concern with providing feedback is that it may lead to affiliation of beliefs about
the valuation of the object for sale, as explained by Harrison, Harstad and Rutström [2004].
36 See Rutström [1998] and Kagel, Harstad and Levin [1987] for discussions of this problem with Vickrey
auctions.
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studied the effect of not providing feedback on winning bids during repetitive trials.
35
Although Vickrey auctions are in general demand-revealing, it is possible that we may not elicit
truthful responses with this institution if subjects do not understand the dominant strategy logic.
36 An
alternative procedure, known as the Multiple Price List (MPL) auction and shown in Table 1, has been
employed by Kirby and Marakoviƒ [1995], Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999], Coller and Williams [1999]
and Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002]. The idea is to offer subjects a series of choices between a
short-term reward and a longer-term reward, and to vary the parameters of the reward in the series
offered to any one subject. One could vary the principal amount, the time horizon between the two
rewards, the FED, the rate of return implied by the choices, the way in which the alternatives are
ordered when presented to subjects, or any combination of these. The logic of telling the truth is even
more transparent than in the bidding setting, since the subject literally gets the binary choice he or she
makes.
One difference between the implementation of the MPL procedures across these studies is the
ordering of the payoff choices. Kirby and Marakoviƒ [1995] and Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999]
presented the options to each subject in a random order, whereas Coller and Williams [1999] and
Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] presented them in increasing order of the implied rate of return.
The latter ordering was employed to make the trade-off to subjects transparent, and hence to focus on
the trade-off rather than on the computational difficulty of comparing the alternatives. Moreover,
Coller and Williams [1999] and Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] presented the annual rate of return
and the annual effective rate of return for each option, whereas the other studies did not. In addition
to achieving consistency with the informational requirements of “fair lending laws” in most developed
countries, these procedures likely minimize the informational burden of the task and focus the subject
on the trade-offs entailed by the alternatives.37  Kirby and Marakoviƒ [1996] deleted some subjects due to inconsistent responses, and we summarize their
final sample of 621. Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999] used heroin addicts as well as 60 control subjects that were not heroin
addicts, and we report results for the latter sample only. The financial incentives for the Kirby and Marakoviƒ [1996]
study were also relatively weak: 2,000 students were asked to return the questionnaire, knowing that one of those that
returned the survey would be eligible to receive up to $85 based on their responses. If the students correctly guessed the
potential sample size of 2000, and assumed optimistically that they were awarded the $85 prize, the expected payoff from
returning the questionnaire was only 4.25 cents. If they rationally estimated that only 672 would return the questionnaire,
and continued to be optimistic with respect to the $85 prize, the expected payoff changes to 13 cents.
38 One of the intentions behind such “jumbled up” payoff matrices is to avoid framing effects which may occur
when subjects evaluate options in an ordered sequence. These framing effects emerge when subjects anchor on the first
option and evaluate all subsequent offers in relation to the first. Since the MPL presents all options simultaneously to
subjects, in one payoff matrix, we do not believe that the choice between jumbling or ordering will significantly affect
framing in our setting. One concern with the MPL procedures used in Coller and Williams [1999] and Harrison, Lau and
Williams [2002] is that the use of a fixed array of alternatives might “cue” subjects to switch their payment preference
somewhere in the middle of the table. This hypothesis would be easy to test by varying the number of rows or changing
the numerical values in the same number of rows. However, our design is focused on a comparison across FED
treatments that all use the MPL method, so any effect from that method would be applicable to all of our FED
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Another difference across studies is whether the principal amount was varied. Coller and
Williams [1999] and Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] maintained the same principal amount for all
of the short-term options, so that the only thing that varied for each subject was the rate of return in
the longer-term reward. Again, the objective was to make the trade-off transparent, rather than
additionally test if the subject was able to make these calculations. To illustrate the potential
importance of this simple design feature, Table B1 lists the options offered in Kirby and Marakoviƒ
[1995] and Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999] in order of the implied annual effective rate of return on
each choice: the actual order presented to the subjects is listed in the first column. Table B1 also
shows the percentage of subjects that chose the deferred payment option.
37 It is obvious from Table
B1 that the change in the percentage of subjects choosing the deferred option is not monotonic, a fact
which may reflect the additional computational burden of the task.
Yet another difference is whether individual subjects faced differing choice horizons. Coller
and Williams [1999] and Harrison, Lau and Williams [2002] provided the subjects with only one time
horizon in each payoff table, while Kirby and Marakoviƒ [1995] and Kirby, Petry and Bickel [1999]
had many different time horizons in the same payoff table.  Although Harrison, Lau and Williams
[2002] vary the time horizon across subjects and ask some of their subjects to fill in responses for all
four horizons, within each MPL payoff table the subject had only one time horizon to consider.
There may be legitimate reasons for using these “jumbled up” tasks, such as when there are
strong reasons to suspect framing effects,
38 but such tests make any inferences about discount ratestreatments.
39  Such joint tests are quite interesting, and of some importance for policy settings in which there are no
regulatory constraints on the information that must be provided in financial transactions, or where decision-makers
might not understand the import of the information provided, but they are tests that are best undertaken after we have
resolved how to elicit discount rates in the most transparent setting possible. We would add to this list tests of the effects
of elicitation mode: for reasons described in Harrison, Harstad and Rutström [2004], we are not surprised that there is
considerable variation in elicited responses to discount rate questions in the psychology literature when the choices are
framed differently.
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joint hypothesis tests, that the subject is able to make these comparisons despite their computational
difficulty, and that the subject chooses the preferred alternative in accord with his true discount rate.
39
In the experiments reported here, we choose to simplify the computational aspect of the  choice we
ask subjects to make. We employ the MPL mechanism using a constant principal amount with choices
ordered in terms of increasing rates of return. We provide subjects with both the annual interest rate
and the annual effective rate implied by each choice. We also implement the different time horizons
on a between subject basis.
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A. KIRBY AND MARAKOVI‚ [1996]
15 $53 $55 $2 55 27% 12
4 $34 $35 $1 43 27% 12
7 $83 $85 $2 35 28% 12
12 $65 $75 $10 50 180% 44
20 $27 $30 $3 35 196% 17
9 $48 $55 $7 45 197% 34
8 $21 $30 $9 75 454% 36
16 $47 $60 $13 50 480% 57
18 $50 $80 $30 70 1021% 74
3 $67 $85 $18 35 1056% 70
10 $40 $65 $25 70 1114% 67
14 $30 $35 $5 20 1503% 44
19 $45 $70 $25 35 9312% 90
2 $40 $55 $15 25 9708% 71
11 $25 $35 $10 25 12613% 68
21 $16 $30 $14 35 64171% 86
6 $32 $55 $23 20 1713182% 94
17 $40 $70 $30 20 2369554% 97
1 $30 $85 $55 14 42708226751144% 99
13 $24 $55 $31 10 923532365791074% 99
5 $15 $35 $20 10 1766705945627180% 99
B. KIRBY, PETRY AND BICKEL [1999]
13 $34 $35 $1 186 6% 0
9 $78 $80 $2 162 6% 2
1 $54 $55 $1 117 6% 2
20 $28 $30 $2 179 15% 0
17 $80 $85 $5 157 15% 0
6 $47 $50 $3 160 15% 2
26 $22 $25 $3 136 40% 0
12 $67 $75 $8 119 41% 3
24 $54 $60 $6 111 41% 5
16 $49 $60 $11 89 127% 10
22 $25 $30 $5 80 127% 3
15 $69 $85 $16 91 128% 20
2 $55 $75 $20 61 524% 33
10 $40 $55 $15 62 535% 20
3 $19 $25 $6 53 545% 22
21 $34 $50 $16 30 10130% 52
18 $24 $35 $11 29 10716% 30
25 $54 $80 $26 30 11078% 67
14 $27 $50 $23 21 3868337% 85
23 $41 $75 $34 20 5259992% 90
5 $14 $25 $11 19 5904279% 72
8 $25 $60 $35 14 598219411260% 93
19 $33 $80 $47 14 774637209375% 100
7 $15 $35 $20 13 1549267326926% 90
11 $11 $30 $19 7 2563880995240443200000000% 100
4 $31 $85 $54 7 3377984399504987200000000% 100
27 $20 $55 $35 7 3928735811211553600000000% 98